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It is familiar to find rules that have explicit or implicit exceptions for cases of necessity
or emergency. It is unfamiliar to find rules without any such exceptions . . . .The
consequences of making exceptions depend on the details.
Cass R. Sunstein'
It is a capital mistake to theorize before one has data. Insensibly one begins to twist
facts to suit theories, instead of theories to suit facts.
Sherlock Holmes2
t Assistant Professor, Tel Aviv University, Faculty of Law. S.J.D. 1997, LL.M. 1992,
Harvard Law School; LL.B. 1986, Tel Aviv University. I would like to thank Professors Frederick
Schauer, Fionnuala Ni Aolain, Richard Fallon, and Abram Chayes for all their help. Some of the
ideas developed in this Article were presented in a faculty seminar at the University College, Galway,
the Republic of Ireland, and I wish to thank Dean Cohn Campbell and the participants of the seminar
for their comments. Of course, all the usual caveats apply.
1. Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REv. 953, 962-63 (1995).
2. 1 ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, A SCANDAL IN BOHEMIA, reprinted in SHERLOCK HOLMES:
THE COMPLETE NOVELS AND STORIES 209, 212 (1986).
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I. INTRODUCTION
Emergencies are certain to occur during the lifetime of any community.
While their nature and character, their intensity and frequency, may vary
substantially from one community to another and from one period to the next
within the same community, it is certain that they will occur.
Exigencies provoke the use of emergency powers by governmental
authorities. The vast scope of such powers and their ability to interfere with
fundamental individual rights and civil liberties and to allow governmental
regulation of virtually all aspects of human activity-as well as the possibility
of their abuse-emphasize the pressing need for clearly defining the
situations in which they may be invoked.' Yet, defining a "state of
emergency"' is no easy task.' It may even be argued that defining
"emergency" is not a meaningful project. Whatever the tools used to attend
to this definitional problem, some of the terms that will eventually be used
are inherently open-ended and manipulable. Overly flexible definitions allow
decisionmakers a relatively wide margin of discretion without setting real
guidelines for their actions. Furthermore, it is not at all clear that even if a
3. "[IThe absence of consensus as to when a public emergency occurs [makes it] by no
means plain when exactly a State is allowed by international law to derogate from its obligations to
respect and ensure human rights." Yoram Dinstein, The Reform of the Protection of Human Rights
During Armed Conflicts and Periods of Emergency and Crisis, in THE REFORM OF INTERNATIONAL
INSTITUTIONS FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: FIRST INTERNATIONAL COLLOQUIUM ON
HUMAN RIGHTS 337, 349 (International Colloquium on Human Rights ed., 1993).
4. Domestic legal systems employ a wide variety of terms when dealing with the
phenomenon of emergency. Frequently, one may encounter several terms used within the same legal
system. Many constitutions establish a dual structure of emergency regimes that recognizes two
possible types of emergencies such as a "State of Emergency" and a "State of Siege" or a "State of
War." See, e.g., GRONDWET [Constitution] [GRw. NED.] arts. 93, 103 (Neth.); CONSTrruIeAo DA
REPOBLICA PORTUGUESA [Constitution] arts. 19, 141 (Port.); USTAVA REPUBLIKE SLOVENIJE
[Constitution] art. 92 (Slovn.). Some systems adopt multilevel legal and constitutional arrangements
dealing with emergencies. Thus, for example, article 91 of the German Basic Law tackles the issue of
"Internal Emergency" ("Innerer Notstand"), article 80a refers to the "State of Tension"
("Spannungsfall"), and chapter Xa (articles ll5a-i) deals with the "State of Defense"
("Verteidigungsfall"). See JOHN E. FINN, CONSTITUTIONS IN CRISIS: POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND THE
RULE OF LAW 197-99 (1991) (discussing examples); Note, Recent Emergency Legislation in West
Germany, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1704 (1969) (discussing German law). Similarly, the Canadian
Emergencies Act authorizes the Governor in Council (the federal government) to declare four different
types of emergencies: "public welfare emergency" (section 5), "public order emergency" (section 16),
"international emergency" (section 27), and "war emergency" (section 37). See Peter Rosenthal, The
New Emergencies Act: Four Times the War Measures Act, 20 MANITOBA L.J. 563, 565-73 (1991);
Eliot Tenofsky, The War Measures and Emergency Acts: Implications for Canadian Civil Rights and
Liberties, 19 AM. REv. CAN. STUD. 293, 296-97 (1989). Finally, no fewer than nine different states
of exception can be found in the constitutions of Latin and South American countries, including,
among others, the state of siege (estado de sitio), state of emergency (estado de emergencia), state of
alarm (estado de alarma), state of prevention (estado de prevenci6n), state of defense (estado de
defensa), and state of war (estado de guerra). See generally NARCISO J. LUGONES, LEYES DE
EMERGENCIA: DECRETOS DE NECESIDAD Y URGENCIA [EMERGENCY LAWS: DECREES OF NECESSITY
AND URGENCY] (1992); DIEGO VALADtS, LA DICTADURA CONSTITUCIONAL EN AMPRICA LATINA
[CONSTITUTIONAL DICTATORSHIP IN LATIN AMERICA] (1974).
5. "[N]o statute defines a national emergency .... The test for when a national emergency
exists is completely subjective-anything the President says is a national emergency is a national
emergency . . . . " Note, The National Emergency Dilemma: Balancing the Executive's Crisis Powers
with the Need for Accountability, 52 S. CAL. L. REv. 1453, 1458-59 (1979).
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working definition of "emergency" could be formulated, it would stand the
test of actual exigencies. In times of crisis, legal niceties may be cast aside as
luxuries enjoyable only in times of peace and tranquility.6
The term "emergency" is, by its nature, an "elastic concept." 7 The
difficulty of defining it in advance was cogently captured by Alexander
Hamilton when he wrote that
it is impossible to foresee or to define the extent and variety of national exigencies, and
the correspondent extent and variety of the means which may be necessary to satisfy
them. The circumstances that endanger the safety of nations are infinite, and for this
reason no constitutional shackles can wisely be imposed on the power to which the care
of it is committed!
Traditionally, emergencies were considered in terms of a dichotomized
dialectic. The term "emergency" connotes a sudden, urgent, usually
unforeseen event or situation that requires immediate action,9 often without
time for prior reflection and consideration. The notion of "emergency" is
inherently linked to the concept of "normalcy" in the sense that the former is
considered to be outside the ordinary course of events or anticipated actions.
To recognize an emergency, we must, therefore, have the background of
normalcy.10 Furthermore, in order to be able to talk about normalcy and
6. As Margaret Thatcher noted:
To beat off your enemy in a war, you have to suspend some of your civil liberties for a
time. Yes, some of those measures do restrict freedom. But those who choose to live by
the bomb and the gun, and those who support them, can't in all circumstances be
accorded exactly the same rights as everyone else. We do sometimes have to sacrifice a
little of the freedom we cherish in order to defend ourselves from those whose aim is to
destroy that freedom altogether.
Dan Fisher, Critics See Nation Switching Roles with Soviets; Own Rights Eroding, Britons Say, L.A.
TIMES, Apr. 6, 1989, at 6 (quoting Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher).
7. H.P. LEE, EMERGENCY POWERS 4 (1984); see also Ningkan v. Government of Malaysia
[1970] A.C. 379, 390 ("[IThe natural meaning of the word [emergency] itself is capable of covering a
very wide range of situations and occurrences, including such diverse events as wars, famines,
earthquakes, floods, epidemics and the collapse of civil government."); Bhagat Singh & Others v. The
King Emperor, A.I.R. 1931 P.C. 111, 111 ("A state of emergency is something that does not permit
of any exact definition. It connotes a state of matters calling for drastic action. . . ."). Moreover, as
the International Law Association maintained,
[i]t is neither desirable nor possible to stipulate in abstracto what particular type or
types of events will automatically constitute a public emergency within the meaning of
the term; each case has to be judged on its own merits taking into account the
overriding concern for the continuance of a democratic society.
ILA Paris Report 59 (1984), quoted in JAIME ORAA, HUMAN RIGHTS IN STATES OF EMERGENCY IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 31 (1992).
8. THE FEDERALIST No. 23, at 153 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
This inherent difficulty has led some scholars to conclude that formulating an abstract definition of
emergency may be futile or unnecessary. See JOHN HATCHARD, INDIVIDUAL FREEDOMS AND STATE
SECURITY IN THE AFRICAN CONTExT: THE CASE OF ZIMBABWE 2 (1993); LEE, supra note 7, at 5. For
similar conclusions regarding the related concept of "national security," see Peter Hanks, National
Security-A Political Concept, 14 MONASH U. L. REV. 114, 117-18 (1988) (discussing versatility of
"the national security 'trump'" in American, British, Australian, and Canadian jurisprudence); and J.
A. Tapia-Vald s, A Typology of National Security Policies, 9 YALE J. WORLD PUB. ORDER 10, 10-11
(1982) (arguing that concept of national security necessarily depends on questions of ideology and is
more political category than purely military concept).
9. See NEW SHORTER OxFoRD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 806 (5th ed. 1993)
10. The term "normalcy" was coined by Warren Harding during the 1920 presidential
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emergency in any meaningful way, the concept of emergency must be
informed by notions of temporariness and exception. For normalcy to be
"normal," it has to be the general rule, the ordinary state of affairs, whereas
emergency must constitute no more than an exception to that rule'-it must
last only a relatively short time and yield no substantial permanent effects.
Whatever the definitional difficulties concerning the concept of
"emergency," the elements of temporariness and exceptional nature are
widely accepted as the common denominators that make a dialogue on the
issue of emergency possible.' Thus, traditional discourse on emergency
powers posits normalcy and exigency as two separate phenomena and
assumes that emergency is the exception. Thus, the governing paradigm is
that of the "normalcy-rule, emergency-exception."13
This Article examines the viability of the traditional discourse on
emergency regimes through the prism of the derogation regime established
under three major international human rights conventions. The subject matter
of public emergency presents a background for a head-on collision between
state sovereignty and national security on the one hand, and the growing
international involvement in protecting individual human rights against state
encroachment on the other hand. 4 Mindful of this conflict and keen to
campaign. See ROBERT K. MURRAY, THE POLITICS OF NORMALCY: GOVERNMENTAL THEORY AND
PRACTICE IN THE HARDING-COOLIDGE ERA 9 (1973). By "normalcy," Harding did not refer to "the old
order, but a regular steady order of things. I mean normal procedure, the natural way, without
excess." Id. at 15. Harding's message that "America's present need is not heroics but healing; not
nostrums but normalcy," id. at 9, was the conservative response to the problems facing postwar
America, such as price increases, unemployment, rapid demobilization, the debates over the League of
Nations, and the subsequent deflation. See id. at 2-5.
11. A reversed image of the relationship between normalcy and emergency arises out of Carl
Schmitt's theory of the "state of exception" ("Ausnahmezustand"). According to this theory, every
legal norm presupposes the existence of a certain normal and ordinary state of affairs and can
therefore be applied only as long as this state of affairs continues to exist. In exceptional
circumstances in which this normal state of affairs is interrupted, the legal norm is no longer
applicable and cannot fulfill its ordinary regulatory function. Thus, the concept of the "state of
exception" inherently implies the existence of a normal state of affairs, and, in fact, a normal
constitutional order, controlled and regulated by constitutional norms. For Schmitt, the exception not
only confirms the rule but is the source of the rule's very existence. Inasmuch as crises represent the
sphere of the political (indeed, the apex of politics) and given the primacy of politics over all other
spheres of human endeavor (including law), Schmitt argues that it is the exception that defines the
norm and not vice versa-the exception is primary to the norm and defines and informs that norm. In
short, "[tihe rule proves nothing; the exception proves everything." WILLIAM E. SCHEUERMAN,
BETWEEN THE NORM AND THE EXCEPTION 36 (1994) (quoting CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY
15 (1988)). See generally JOSEPH W. BENDERSKY, CARL SCHMITT: THEORIST FOR THE REICH (1983);
DAVID DYZENHAUS, LEGALITY AND LEGITIMACY: CARL SCHMITT, HANS KELSEN, AND HERMANN
HELLER IN WEIMAR REPUBLIC (1997); GEORGE SCHWAB, THE CHALLENGE OF THE EXCEPTION: AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE POLITICAL IDEALS OF CARL SCHMITT BETWEEN 1921 AND 1936 (2d ed. 1989).
12. See infra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
13. The formula of "normalcy-rule, emergency-exception" may be replaced by a formula
referring to a presumption of normalcy where emergency constitutes a rebuttal to that presumption.
See Sunstein, supra note 1, at 963 ("A rule with necessity or emergency exceptions might be
described, somewhat imprecisely, as a strong presumption.").
14. See Joan F. Hartman, Derogation from Human Rights Treaties in Public Emergencies,
22 HARv. INT'L L.J. 1, 2 (1981). See generally PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST'S MODERN
INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 220-21 (7th ed. 1997) (discussing human rights as matter of
international concern).
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preserve governmental maneuverability in the face of emergency, I" the
drafters of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention), 6 the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),"7 and the American Convention on
Human Rights (American Convention)18 included derogation clauses in each
of the three documents.' 9 Designed to accommodate the needs of the state
with the rights of individuals, the derogation clauses seek primarily to allow
governmental action infringing recognized individual rights in a period of
extreme emergency beyond what governments lawfully could do in times of
normalcy." "[Tihe derogation articles embody an uneasy compromise
between the protection of individual rights and the protection of national
needs in times of crisis."2' Within the framework of the conventions, the
15. Thus, for example, during the preparatory work on the European Convention, a U.K.
delegate stated that "[i]t is defined in every declaration of human rights that in times of emergency the
safety of the community is of first concern." Hartman, supra note 14, at 4.
16. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4,
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953) [hereinafter European Convention].
17. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171,
6 I.L.M. 368 [hereinafter ICCPR].
18. American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S. Official Records
OEA/ser. K/XVII1.1, doe. 65 rev. 1 corr. 1 (entered into force July 18, 1978), 9 I.L.M. 673 (1970)
[hereinafter American Convention].
19. Article 15(1) of the European Convention states:
In times of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation any High
Contracting Party may take measures derogating from its obligations under this
Convention to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided
that such measures are not inconsistent with its obligations under international law.
European Convention, supra note 16, art. 15(1). Similarly, the ICCPR provides:
In times of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the existence of
which is officially proclaimed, the States Parties to the present Covenant may take
measures derogating from their obligations under the present Covenant to the extent
strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not
inconsistent with their obligations under international law ....
ICCPR, supra note 17, art. 4(1). Finally, the American Convention states:
In times of war, public danger, or other emergency that threatens the independence or
security of a State Party, it may take measures derogating from its obligations under the
present Convention to the extent and for the period of time strictly required by the
exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its
other obligations under international law ....
American Convention, supra note 18, art 27(1).
20. See Hartman, supra note 14, at 6-7, 14-15 (explaining that derogation clauses are result
of practical desire to retain government flexibility with regard to employment of emergency
measures). Higgins, who considers the derogation clauses as designed to better control, rather than
expand, the scope of legitimate governmental action, expresses the opposite position. According to
that position, the need for a derogation clause emanated from the imprecision of the ordinary limitation
clauses and their inability to provide a clear guideline for the conduct of governments' public
emergencies threatening the life of the nation. See Rosalyn Higgins, Derogations Under Human Rights
Treaties, 48 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 281, 286 (1976-1977).
21. Hartman, supra note 14, at 2. The derogation regime was established against the
backdrop of certain general doctrines of international law such as necessity and self-defense. See
INTERNATIONAL COMM'N OF JURISTS, STATES OF EMERGENCY: THEIR IMPACT ON HUMAN RIGHTS 413
(1983); N. Questiaux, Study of the Implications for Human Rights of Recent Developments Concerning
Situations Known as States of Siege or Emergency, U.N. ESCOR, 35th Sess. § 60, at 16, U.N. Doe.
EICN.4/Sub.2/1982/15 (1982) [hereinafter Questiaux Report]. The doctrines of necessity and self-
defense may still be relevant today even in the context of human rights protection under regional and
international systems, as certain human rights conventions, such as the African Charter on Human and
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derogation regime acknowledges the possibility of a signatory state
derogating from some of the individual rights protected under the
conventions in extraordinary times and under specified conditions.
Emergency measures taken in accordance with the conventions operate from
within the legal system. In times of national danger, states are required to
balance security interests and individual rights concerns according to a set of
rules that both define the circumstances in which they may exercise
emergency measures that infringe upon enforceable human rights and what
measures they can use.
The derogation regime is premised on, and constructed around, the
basic assumption that emergency is a distinct and extraordinary exception to
the general rule of normalcy. By analyzing the jurisprudence of the European
Court of Human Rights (Court) and the European Commission of Human
Rights (Commission), this Article's main purpose is to demonstrate the
danger of overreliance on the "normalcy-rule, emergency-exception"
paradigm. The normative rules prescribed by the derogation regime may
prove useful in a world governed by that basic paradigm. When applied to
situations diverging from that model, however, these rules fail to safeguard
the very interests that the human rights conventions aim to protect. Adopting
the traditional view concerning the normalcy-emergency relationship, both
the European Court and the Commission have ignored, for the most part, the
phenomena of permanent, entrenched, or de facto emergencies reflected in
the cases coming before them. This may lead, in turn, to attempts to solve
questions at hand by applying the wrong medicine as a result of a faulty
diagnosis.
This Article seeks to demonstrate this point by critically examining the
jurisprudence of the European Court and Commission in two types of cases.
The first group involves an explicit derogation-a government's recognition
of the existence of a state of public emergency-when, in fact, the situation
is an entrenched emergency. The paradigmatic cases in this context are those
resulting from the conflict in Northern Ireland. The second group of cases
arises as a consequence of Turkey's fight against the Kurds. These cases
Peoples' Rights, do not include any special emergency provisions similar to the derogation clauses.
See African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, June 26, 1981, O.A.U. Doc. CABILEGI67I3
rev. 5 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1986), 21 I.L.M. 59 (1982) [hereinafter African Charter]; see also
ORAA, supra note 7, at 209 (discussing why African Charter does not include derogation clause).
Given this omission, principles of general international law concerning the need to comply with treaty
obligations in circumstances of emergency would be applicable. See id. at 210. In addition, principles
of general international law are also relevant with respect to those states that are not party to any
international or regional human rights instruments:
At this stage in the evolution of international law, it is clear that customary law imposes
international obligations in the area of human rights which are binding even for States
which are non-parties of human rights treaties. However, once the content of the
customary international law applicable to normal situations has been ascertained, the
problem is to determine the principles regulating the human rights obligations of States
in situations of emergency.
Id. at 211.
22. See Questiaux Report, supra note 21, §§ 96-147, at 26-33; SuBRATA Roy CHOWDHURY,
RULE OF LAW IN A STATE OF EMERGENCY 45-56 (1989); INTERNATIONAL COMM'N OF JURISTS, supra
note 21, at 413-17.
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raise the issue of systematic human rights violations. The common
denominator between these two sets of cases is, therefore, the underlying
factual negation of any claim to normalcy as the general way of life. In both
categories of cases, the exception has swallowed the general rule.
Entrenched emergency has become the ordinary state of affairs in Northern
Ireland, while violations of human rights in Turkey are a matter of ongoing
practice rather than a mere aberration. Furthermore, the Article argues that
the European Court and Commission have so far failed to address adequately
the challenges that these two types of cases raise. The main reason for that
systemic failure is the international community's attachment to the notion of
"normalcy-rule, emergency-exception."
This Article seeks to accomplish two goals. First, by challenging the
"normalcy-rule, emergency-exception" paradigm, it attempts to provoke
reassessment of traditional approaches to emergency regimes. Crisis and
emergency are no longer sporadic episodes in the lives of many nations; they
are increasingly becoming a permanent fixture in the unfolding story of
humanity. One need not subscribe to notions of a climacteric of crises 3 to
recognize that fact. For example, a study published in 1978 estimated that at
least thirty of the 150 countries then existing were under a state of
emergency.24 Similarly, a substantial number of states have entered a formal
derogation notice under article 4(3) of the ICCPR.2' This number does not
include states that are not signatories to the ICCPR or that experience de
facto emergencies that they do not officially proclaim and notify.26 Nor does
it take account of those states that have routinized and institutionalized
emergency measures in their ordinary legal system.27 Moreover, not only has
emergency expanded to an ever greater number of nations, but within the
affected nations, it has extended its scope and strengthened its grip.
Observations that "[e]mergency government has become the norm"' 21 can no
longer be dismissed out of hand.
Second, commentators often claim that if domestic legal systems do not
successfully slow the rush towards emergency measures in times of
exigencies, supervision and monitoring by the international community
nevertheless can safeguard individual rights.29 As states face modifications to
23. See Arthur S. Miller, Reason of State and the Emergent Constitution of Control, 64
MINN. L. REv. 585, 613 (1980).
24. See Daniel O'Donnell, States of Exception, 21 INT'L COMM'N JURIsT REv. 52, 53
(1978).
25. For a list of derogation notices so entered, see The United Nations Treaty Collection:
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (visited Apr. 28, 1998)
<http:lwww.un.orglDeptslTreatyfinalts2/newfileslpartboolivbooliv_4.html>.
26. On de facto emergencies, see Questiaux Report, supra note 21, §§ 99-111, at 26-28;
and CHOWDHURY, supra note 22, at 45.
27. See Questiaux Report, supra note 21, §§ 129-145, at 26-28; CHOWDHORY, supra note
22, at 45-56.
28. A Brief History of Emergency Powers in the United States, Working Paper Prepared for
the Special Committee on National Emergencies and Delegated Emergency Powers, U.S. Senate, 93d
Cong., 2d sess., at v; see also Arthur S. Miller, Crisis Government Becomes the Norm, 39 Ouio ST.
L.J. 736 (1978) (predicting that crisis government will become worldwide norm).
29. See George J. Alexander, The Illusory Protection of Human Rights by National Courts
1998]
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traditional notions of sovereignty to accommodate greater external
intervention in their internal affairs, 30 they also come to rely more on the
ability of international mechanisms to bring errant states into line. Perhaps
the most expansive inroads into the fortress of states' sovereignty have been
made in the area of human rights.31 Because states of emergency constitute
the clearest challenges to individual rights and liberties, it should come as no
surprise that international institutions, both regional and global, have been
expected to assume a leading role in protecting human rights and liberties
during national exigencies. Trusting international adjudicatory institutions
seems all the more appropriate when one realizes 'that regional and
international courts are much less likely to succumb to aroused national
emotions than are national courts, which comprise an integral part of their
communities and therefore tend to support their governments in times of
acute exigency.32 Unfortunately, the jurisprudence of the Court and the
Commission casts doubt on the validity of these optimistic assessments.
The thesis put forward in this Article is not relevant only on the
international level. The sphere of international law cannot be separated
entirely from the domestic one. "International" and "national" are closely
linked in a symbiotic relationship in which one sphere influences and shapes
the evolution of the other. International law does not have an autonomous
existence distinct from, among other things, the domestic realities of states.33
Domestic politics is knit together with international relations;34 international
law is informed by national legal systems, institutions, and actions and in
turn informs them. International law's vision of emergency powers not only
gives us a better understanding of domestic emergency regimes but is, in
fact, an integral part of that understanding. This link is perhaps clearest in
the European system of human rights under the European Convention. 5
During Periods of Emergency, 5 HuM. RTS. L.J. 1, 3 (1984) ("It is entirely possible that superior
courts whose relevant executive authority is not threatened may in fact effectively place limits on
subordinate executives. Thus, for example, the European Court of Human Rights can place limits on
national executives from countries which are signatories to the European Human Rights
Convention."); see also D.J. HARRIS ET AL., LAW OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
490 (1995) ("In the nature of things, the national judicial means of redress will often have been
undermined, so the responsibility of international institutions is the more compelling.").
30. See ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A DIVIDED WORLD 287-90 (1988).
31. See id. at 287-90.
32. See Alexander, supra note 29, at 27-63. This text comprises Alexander's analysis of the
performance of the court systems of selected common law countries during periods of emergency. The
countries examined include Great Britain, South Africa, Ireland, New Zealand, Canada, Australia,
India, and the United States. See id.
33. See Louis HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE 12-27 (2d ed. 1979).
34. See id. at 28. The connection between domestic politics and international relations has
been the focus of much writing by international relations scholars dealing with the "second image,"
the "second image reversed," and the "two-level game" theories. See, e.g., Peter Gourevitch, The
Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics, 32 INT'L ORG. 881, 881-911
(1978); Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, 42
INT'L ORG. 427, 427-60 (1988); Michael Zurn, Bringing the Second Image (Back) In: About tile
Domestic Sources of Regime Formation, in REGIME THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 282,
282-311 (Volker Rittberger & Peter Mayer eds., 1993).
35. On the European Convention system, see generally RALPH BEDDARD, HUMAN RIGHTS
AND EUROPE (3d ed. 1993); and P. VAN DIJK & G.J.H. VAN HOOF, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE
Entrenched Emergencies
Under the municipal constitutional laws of several European nations, the
European Convention operates directly on individuals subject to the relevant
domestic legal systems and may enjoy a higher hierarchical status than the
national legislature's own legislative enactments. 6
Part II of the Article sets out the basic structure of the derogation
regimes of the European Convention, the American Convention, and the
ICCPR. It demonstrates how the regime rests on the basic "normalcy-rule,
emergency-exception" paradigm and on the twin components of
temporariness and exceptionality. In so doing, it situates the derogation
regime within the framework of traditional discourse on emergency regimes
and powers. Part III examines the theory underlying the derogation regime
as interpreted, explained, and applied by the European Court and the
Commission 7 in cases coming before these two institutions. A detailed
analysis of the case law not only shows the discrepancy between theory and
practice and between judicial rhetoric and judicial decisions in the area of
emergency law, but also challenges the very foundation of the emergency
regime. Part IV discusses the systemic difficulties that the Court and the
Commission face when dealing with emergencies. These difficulties, it is
argued, result in national governments faring well when their decisions
concerning the existence of a particular situation of emergency are reviewed
by the European human rights judicial institutions. Thus, the Article
challenges both the assumption that international and regional judicial organs
may be better suited to monitor, supervise, and check national governments'
conduct in times of national emergency and the basic paradigm of the
relationship between normalcy and emergency. The Article concludes with
several proposals designed to ameliorate the systemic difficulties and
improve the ability of the Court and the Commission to safeguard human
rights in times of exigency.
II. INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND PUBLIC EMERGENCIES:
THE LAW ON THE BOOKS
A. The Protection of Rights Under the Conventions: A Three-Tiered
System
The conventions protect three categories of individual rights. Non-
derogable rights, which cannot be abrogated or derogated from either in
times of peace or of war or other public emergencies, receive the strongest
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (2d ed. 1990).
36. See VAN DIK & VAN HoO, supra note 35, at 12-14; Thomas Buergenthal, The
Domestic Status of the European Convention on Human Rights, 13 BUFF. L. REV. 354, 391-92
(1964).
37. I focus on the jurisprudence developed by the European Court and Commission because
the European Convention system has been traditionally viewed as the most advanced and developed of
all international and regional human rights mechanisms. See Burns H. Weston et al., Regional Human
Rights Regimes: A Comparison and Appraisal, 20 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 585, 633 (1987).
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protection. 8 The only limitations on the scope of non-derogable rights are
intrinsic to each right, which is protected within its own definition and its
internal range of application. An action outside those limits is not an
impermissible attempt to derogate from the right at issue since that right does
not apply at all with respect to such an action. The range of non-derogable
rights differs from convention to convention.39
A second category comprises those rights that seem limited only by
their own built-in definitional limitations but that nevertheless can be
derogated from in situations of public emergency under the conventions'
general derogation clauses. Rights falling into this category set their own
limits in ordinary times by means of a predefined scope of applicability. In
38. For that reason, those rights have been described as "emergency-proof" by Eric-Irene
Daes, Special Rapporteur of the U.N. Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection
of Minorities. See The Individual's Duties to the Community and the Limitations on Human Rights and
Freedoms Under Article 29 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, U.N. Doc E/CN4/Sub
2/432/Rev 2, at 197-202 (1983).
39. Four non-derogable rights are common to the ICCPR, the European Convention, and the
American Convention: the right to life; prohibition of torture; prohibition of slavery or servitude; and
prohibition of retroactive criminal laws. See American Convention, supra note 18, arts. 4-6, 9;
ICCPR, supra note 17, arts. 6-8, 15; European Convention, supra note 16, arts. 2-4, 7. Two
additional rights are found in the ICCPR and the American Convention: the rights to recognition of
legal personality and freedom of thought, conscience, and religion. See American Convention, supra
note 18, arts. 3, 12; ICCPR, supra note 17, arts. 16, 18. The prohibition of imprisonment for breach
of contractual obligation is included only in the ICCPR. See ICCPR, supra note 17, art. 11. Finally,
the following non-derogable rights appear only in the American Convention: the rights of the family,
the right to a name, the rights of the child, the right to a nationality, and the right to participate in
government. See American Convention, supra note 18, arts. 17-20, 23. The list of non-derogable
rights included in each of the conventions has been expanded and developed from one convention to
the other. Thus, the European Convention, which is the oldest of the three conventions, includes the
shortest list of non-derogable rights, whereas the American Convention, the most recent, has the
longest list of such rights. In contrast, the African Charter, which was signed and entered into force
after the American Convention, does not include a derogation clause at all, and therefore includes only
rights of the second and third categories. See African Charter, supra note 21. In theory, at least, rights
of the second category are non-derogable according to the meaning given to that concept in the other
three conventions.
Examination of the lists of non-derogable rights reveals that a right was included either because
it was deemed to be a fundamental and basic right or because it was such that derogation could not be
"strictly required" by the exigencies of the situation-the right not to be imprisoned for contractual
debt is one example. See JOAN FITZPATRICK, HUMAN RIGHTS IN CRISIS: THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM
FOR PRoTEcTiNG RIGHTS DURING STATES OF EMERGENCY 64 (1994); Ronald St. J. Macdonald,
Derogations Under Article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights, 36 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 225, 230-31 (1997). Hartman suggests that the enumeration of the four common non-
derogable rights reflects existing conventional and customary international law, although the inclusion
of the other rights in the different lists does not, in and of itself, necessarily identify them as
"fundamental" rights. See Hartman, supra note 14, at 15; see also Daphna Shraga, Human Rights in
Emergency Situations Under the European Convention on Human Rights, 16 IsR. Y.B. HUM. RTs.
217, 232-34 (1986) (noting that right to life, freedom from torture, and freedom from slavery and
servitude-that is, three of four common non-derogable rights-constitutejus cogens norms). On these
issues, the Questiaux Report states:
mhe idea of a basic minimum from which no derogation is possible, is present in a
sufficient number of instruments to justify our approaching the matter by reference to a
general principle of law recognized in practice by the international community, which
could, moreover, regard it as a peremptory norm of international law ....
Questiaux Report, supra note 21, § 68, at 19. There are conflicting views as to whether the lists of
non-derogable rights under the human rights conventions ought to be expanded and their ambit
broadened to encompass additional rights. See, e.g., Shraga, supra, at 235-41.
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times of extraordinary peril, however, they may be further derogated from in
accordance with the procedural and substantive guidelines set out in the
applicable derogation clauses.
The third group includes rights that not only can be derogated from in
times of emergency but also can be limited by resort to external limitations
transcending definitional restrictions. Reconciling such individual rights with
the needs and interests of the community at large0 in situations falling short
of a public emergency crisis is further facilitated by "limitations clauses"4
that permit, even in ordinary times, a breach of an obligation imposed by the
convention for specified reasons such as public order, public safety, morals,
or national security.42
The second and third categories of rights are subject to possible
derogations in accordance with the general derogation clauses of the ICCPR,
the European Convention, and the American Convention,43 which apply only
in situations that amount to a "public emergency."' Under special
40. See Higgins, supra note 20, at 281.
41. Those clauses are also sometimes known as "accommodation clauses" to emphasize that
their main goal is, indeed, accommodating individual rights and liberties, on the one hand, and the
interests and the needs of the community, on the other hand. See Christoph Schreuer, Derogation of
Human Rights in Situations of Public Emergency: The Experience of the European Convention on
Human Rights, 9 YALE J. WORLD PUn. ORDER 113, 113 (1982); see also HATCHARD, supra note 8, at
3 (speaking of "clawback clauses"); Higgins, supra note 20, at 281 (same). Accommodating human
rights considerations with the reasonable needs of the state may be achieved by using techniques such
as the limitation clauses, derogation provisions, the possibility of denouncing a convention,
introduction of reservations to the provisions and dictates of the convention, general articles that state
that individual rights may only be exercised in conformity with the rights of others (e.g., article 17 of
the European Convention), and, according to some opinions, the use of the notion of inherent
limitations on individual rights. See id. at 281, 288.
42. See Higgins, supra note 20, at 281. For examples of such circumstances, see European
Convention, supra note 16, art. 6(1) (establishing right to fair and public hearing, but noting that
"press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interest of morals, public order
or national security in a democratic society. .. ."); id. art. 8(2) (establishing right to respect for one's
private and family life, home, and correspondence, but permitting interference by public authority
with exercise of that right "in accordance with the law and when it is necessary in a democratic society
in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the
rights and freedoms of others"); id. art. 9(2) (proclaiming that "[fireedom to manifest one's religion
or beliefs shall be subject only to" the same limitations); id. art. 10(2) (upholding right to freedom of
expression "subject to such . . . restrictions ...as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a
democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the
reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or
for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary"); and id. art. 11(2) (establishing right to
freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association subject to limitations "prescribed by law
and [which] are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety,
for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the protection of
the rights and freedoms of others. .. ").
43. A fourth major human rights convention-the African Charter-does not include a
derogation clause, and merely uses the technique of limitation clauses with respect to certain rights
enumerated therein. See African Charter, supra note 21.
44. Whereas the limitation clauses apply in times of peace and normality, the derogation
clauses "kick in" only when exceptional circumstances of public emergency exist. Other distinctions
between the two types of clauses exist. First, the scope of rights affected is different. Whereas
limitations clauses are rights-specific, the derogation clauses apply across the board to all rights (with
the exception, of course, of the non-derogable ones). Second, state derogation from rights is more
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circumstances, countries may derogate from any of the individual rights
included in the second and third categories "to the extent strictly required by
the exigencies of the situation. "4 Measures which, if employed in ordinary
times, would constitute violations of the state's international obligations may
be legitimate if taken in exceptional circumstances and if certain procedural
and substantive conditions are met.46
B. The Principles of the Derogation Regime
Several principles form the core of the "legal regime of the derogation
clause[s]."'4 They function to minimize the danger of usurpation or abuse of
the derogation power by establishing a set of criteria through which any
particular exercise of that power may be evaluated.45 Compliance with these
principles is necessary to legitimate derogation in a particular case.
Two procedural principles are essential.49  The principle of
proclamation requires an official declaration of the existence of a state of
likely to be scrutinized, as the derogation is subject to international accountability (due to requirement
of notification of derogation under relevant clause). See ORAA, supra note 7, at 9.
45. A debate arose as to the necessity of including derogation clauses in conventions dealing
with human rights. Proponents of inclusion argued that the incorporation of a derogation clause in
each convention would allow more countries to join the conventions without feeling that by doing so
they would compromise their ability to address future crises. Hartman rightly points out that the
derogation clauses result from a realistic approach recognizing that suspension of human rights treaties
is practically inevitable during periods of acute crisis. See Hartman, supra note 14, at 11. In addition,
the presence of a general derogation clause prevented the inclusion of an even larger number of
specific limitations on individual rights. It also enabled the courts to construe broadly the particular
rights included in the conventions without fear that such an expansive construction would impair the
signatory states' ability to defend themselves and their citizens against extreme public emergencies.
The absence of such a "safety net" might have led to a narrower interpretation of particular human
rights. Finally, it was argued that the existence of derogation clauses offered a legal mechanism for
states to deal with crises, thus reducing the states' incentive to disregard and violate the conventions in
times of acute emergency. See id. at 3; Schreuer, supra note 41, at 115.
Opponents of the inclusion of derogation clauses in the conventions, on the other hand,
expressed fear that such articles might divert the focus from the protection of rights to the restrictions,
limitations, and derogations from those rights. The presence of a derogation clause might actually
encourage governments to resort to that mechanism by its very existence and by permitting
considerations of expediency to prevail over true necessity. Moreover, the existence of a derogation
clause could encourage a government to foment violence or at least an atmosphere of fear so as to
invoke the derogation power under the conventions. See Schreuer, supra note 41, at 123. It was also
argued that a general limitation clause or several specific clauses would be sufficient and that there
was no need for the more radical derogation clauses. See Hartman, supra note 14, at 4-5.
46. The question of whether the right to derogate excuses a breach of the conventions or,
alternatively, prevents a breach from taking place due to the fact that the derogation suspends the
derogating state's obligations under the conventions is an open one. See Hartman, supra note 14, at 13
n.70. On the excuse-justification distinction, see generally GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL
LAW 759-875 (1978); Kent Greenawalt, The Perplexing Borders of Justification and Excuse, 84
COLUM. L. REv. 1897 (1984); and Miriam Gur-Arye, Should the Criminal Law Distinguish Betiveen
Necessity as a Justification and Necessity as an Excuse, 102 L.Q. REv. 71 (1986). See also Robert
Ago, Addendum to the Eighth Report on State Responsibility to the International Law Commission, in
[1979] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 13, §§ 48-55, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4SER.AI1980/Add.1 (discussing
concept of "military necessity" and its history).
47. See ORAA, supra note 7, at 3.
48. On the distinction between usurpation and abuse of power, see Lucius Wilmerding, Jr.,
The President and the Lmv, 67 POL. SCL Q. 321, 329 (1952).
49. See Joan F. Hartman, Working Paper for the Committee of Experts on the Article 4
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emergency. Its purpose is to make public the governmental decision that a
state of emergency exists and to reduce the incidence of de facto states of
emergency by requiring states to follow formal procedures set forth in their
own municipal laws.5" This requirement is, therefore, domestically directed.
The second procedural principle is that of notification, which obliges a
derogating state to notify the other parties to the relevant convention, within
a brief period of time and through the depositary of the instrument, of the
derogation. 5' In theory, this principle enables effective international
supervision over derogation measures and allows other states to exercise
their rights under the convention to ensure that all parties comply fully with
the provisions of that instrument.52 Unlike the principle of proclamation, the
Derogation Provision, 7 HuM. RTs. Q. 89, 99 (1985).
50. See Questiaux Report, supra note 21, § 43, at 12; CHOWDHURY, supra note 22, at 28-
29; FITzPATRICK, supra note 39, at 59; ORAA, supra note 7, at 34-35. Hartman adds that another
purpose behind the principle of proclamation is to prevent ex post facto explanations for violations of
individual rights. See Hartman, supra note 49, at 99; Hartman, supra note 14, at 18. A requirement of
an official proclamation appears only in article 4 of the ICCPR. It was, however, mentioned by the
European Commission in Cyprus v. Turkey, App. Nos. 6780174, 6950/75, 4 Eur. H.R. Rep. 482
(1976) (Commission report), and by the European Court in Lawless v. Ireland, 3 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser.
A) § 47, at 61-62 (1960-1961) [hereinafter Lawless (Court)]. In the latter case, the Court ruled that
the principle of proclamation does not constitute a necessary prerequisite for a justifiable derogation.
See id. Even under article 4 of the ICCPR, the principle of proclamation has not been construed to
require the U.N. Human Rights Committee to analyze the compliance of the derogating state with its
own municipal laws or to invalidate a derogation not in compliance with such laws. See ORAA, supra
note 7, at 35-37; Thomas Buergenthal, To Respect and Ensure: State Obligations and Permissible
Derogations, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS: THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL
RIGHTS 72, 80 (Louis Henkin ed., 1981).
The most recent authoritative discussion of this point was made by the European Court in
Brannigan and McBride v. United Kingdom, 258 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1993). In the circumstances
of that case, the Court found that the requirement of "official proclamation" was fulfilled by virtue of
a statement made on December 22, 1988, by the Secretary of State for the Home Department to the
House of Commons that explained in detail the reasons underlying the Government's derogation. See
id. § 73.
51. See Questiaux Report, supra note 21, §§ 44-54, at 13-15.
52. See ORAA, supra note 7, at 58-86. The jurisprudence concerning this principle has
identified certain elements that ought to be contained in a notice of derogation (for example,
specification of convention's provisions from which there has been derogation and reasons for
derogation). See Buergenthal, supra note 50, at 84-86; Hartman, supra note 14, at 18-21; Schreuer,
supra note 41, at 117-20. Three main issues are usually discussed in this context: the required timing
of notification, the substance to be included in the notification, and the role of the Secretary-General
upon receiving such a notification.
Partsch notes that of fifteen derogations reported between 1955 and 1967, only two (the
subjects of litigation in the Lavless and Greek cases) were reported immediately while the rest were
reported several months, or even years, after they took force. In certain cases, the notice of derogation
was submitted to the Secretary-General only after the derogation had, in fact, elapsed; in at least seven
cases, derogations that had been submitted by a state for a dependent territory were terminated only
when that territory gained its independence and the European Convention no longer applied to it. See
Karl Josef Partsch, Experiences Regarding the War and Emergency Clause (Article 15) of the
European Convention on Human Rights, 1 IsR. Y.B. HuM. RTs. 327, 329-30 (1971). But see
Schreuer, supra note 41, at 119 (stating that "recently, compliance has improved greatly and
notifications are provided within days of the imposition of measures derogating from the
Convention"). Be that as it may, a state's compliance with the notification requirement has
traditionally been reviewed independently of the question of the state's justification for the derogation.
See Hartman, supra note 14, at 22; Higgins, supra note 20, at 290-93. Under the current
jurisprudence of the European organs, it seems that a notice of derogation otherwise valid under article
15(1) may be relied upon notwithstanding a failure to comply with the requirements of article 15(3) of
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principle of notification operates on the international level. Proclamation and
notification are therefore complementary rather than alternative
requirements.
The principle of proportionality is one of the basic substantive
principles underlying the derogation regime.53 Proportionality is essential to
the legitimacy and justification of a claim to derogation from otherwise
protected human rights. Even when an act of derogation may be justified
under the conventions, the state does not enjoy unfettered discretion with
respect to the derogation measures that it wishes to pursue.54 Such measures
can only be taken "to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the
situation."55 Derogation measures employed by a government, as well as the
fact of derogation itself, must be proportional to the particular threat, both
with respect to degree and duration. 6 Proportionality of degree implies, inter
alia, that the more severe and intense the threat to the life of the nation, the
more extreme and prejudicial to individual rights emergency measures may
be.5 In addition, where less restrictive alternative measures can tackle the
problem effectively, the government may not employ more draconian means
to fight off the crisis.58 Hence, derogating measures may not be used unless
the measures provided for by the various limitation clauses are insufficient to
deal with the emergency. The measures taken by the government should
also be at least prima facie conducive to terminating the emergency, although
whether they are successful in achieving that goal in fact is not conclusive as
to the question of their legitimacy.' Finally, when examining whether
certain emergency measures implemented by the government comply with
the provision that they be "strictly required," the accepted view is that each
measure ought to be evaluated separately, individually, and independently
with regard to its necessity.'
the Convention. However, Higgins argues that a failure to comply with the latter requirements may be
an indication of bad faith on the part of the derogating government, a fact that is relevant for assessing
its compliance with the conditions specified by section 1 of article 15. See id. at 291; see also
Macdonald, supra note 39, at 252 (stating that failure to meet notification requirements could be taken
as indication of bad faith).
53. For a discussion of the principle of proportionality in the context of derogation from the
human rights conventions see CHOWDHURY, supra note 22, at 101-19; ORAA, supra note 7, at 140-
70; and Macdonald, supra note 39, at 242-45.
54. See ORAA, supra note 7, at 146.
55. The American Convention uses somewhat different language by stating that the
derogation measures may only be taken "to the extent and for the period of time strictly required by
the exigencies of the situation." See American Convention, supra note 18, art. 27. The textual
difference does not reflect any substantive difference between the three articles.
56. See, e.g., Hartman, supra note 14, at 17. For example, derogation measures may not be
employed once the situation no longer constitutes a "public emergency threatening the life of the
nation." See European Convention, supra note 16, art. 15(1).
57. See, e.g., ORAA, supra note 7, at 146, 149.
58. See, e.g., Questlaux Report, supra note 21, § 63, at 17; ORAA, supra note 7, at 148-49.
59. See ORAA, supra note 7, at 146.
60. See Questiaux Report, supra note 21, § 63, at 17; see also ORAA, supra note 7, at 146-
47. Orad explains that there is a requirement of "qualitative proportionality," i.e., each emergency
measure must bear some relation to the particular threat-for example, a natural disaster cannot lead to
the suspension of political rights. See id. at 147.
61. See Hartman, supra note 14, at 31-35 (examining how European Commission and
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Another substantive part of the derogation regime is the principle of
nondiscrimination.62 Under the ICCPR and the American Convention,
emergency measures in derogation from human rights included in these
instruments may not "involve discrimination (solely) on the ground of race,
color, sex, language, religion, or social origin. "6 Although no equivalent
provision appears in article 15 of the European Convention,' the general
principle of proportionality also covers the issue of discrimination. Indeed, it
is difficult to imagine emergency measures designed solely to discriminate
against persons on one of the above-mentioned grounds that still could be
considered "strictly required."
65
Under the derogation regime, emergency measures taken in the face of
a public emergency must not be "inconsistent with [the derogating state's]
other obligations under international law." 66 Such measures, for example,
may not contradict the derogating state's obligations under international
humanitarian law (first and foremost the four Geneva Conventions of
194967), other international human rights conventions, 68  and norms of
customary international law.
European Court apply "strictly required by the exigencies" criteria for valid derogation); Hartman,
supra note 49, at 105-12.
62. See Questiaux Report, supra note 21, §§ 64-66, at 18.
63. The word "solely" appears in article 4(1) of the ICCPR, but not in article 27(1) of the
American Convention. Compare ICCPR, supra note 17, art. 4(1), with American Convention, supra
note 18, art. 27(1).
64. Article 14 of the European Convention, which prohibits discrimination on similar
grounds, is not included in the list of the non-derogable rights. On the relationship between articles 14
and 15 of the European Convention, see OiAA, supra note 7, at 179-82.
65. See, e.g., id. at 174-77, 179-82. It is possible, and the ICCPR explicitly recognizes that
possibility by including the qualification "solely," that emergency measures could be employed mainly
against a certain minority group without constituting impermissible discrimination. When a particular
group of the population poses a distinct security threat endangering the life of the nation, measures
may be taken that are specifically directed at that group. See, e.g., Questiaux Report, supra note 21,
§§ 65-66, at 18; FrrZPATRICK, supra note 39, at 63.
66. ORAA, supra note 7, at 190; see also id. at 190-206; Macdonald, supra note 39, at 245-
48.
67. See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and the
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention
for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at
Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
68. It may be argued that a state that is a signatory to both the European Convention and the
ICCPR would not be allowed to take emergency measures that derogate from a right that, although
derogable under the Convention, is non-derogable under the ICCPR. Under this construction,
derogation from such a right would constitute not only a violation of the ICCPR but also of the
European Convention itself. See, e.g., Higgins, supra note 20, at 305-06; Schreuer, supra note 41, at
129-31; Shraga, supra note 39, at 221-24.
In the case of Brannigan and McBride, the applicants argued before the European Court that a
derogation undertaken by the United Kingdom was "inconsistent with its other obligations under
international law" as it was not "officially proclaimed" and thus failed to comport with the United
Kingdom's obligations under article 4 of the ICCPR. The Court rejected the argument when it found
that, in the relevant circumstances, the derogation could be regarded to have been officially
proclaimed. See Brannigan and McBride v. United Kingdom, 258 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), § 73, at 57
(1993). It is thus still possible that in a case where no such official proclamation is made, a derogating
state may be held liable both under article 4 of the Covenant and article 15 of the European
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The most important prerequisite for a legitimate derogation from
otherwise protected rights is that the circumstances in which the derogation
has been effected must constitute a "public emergency" of a certain specified
degree-the principle of the exceptional threat. 9 There are slight textual
differences among the three derogation clauses in the framing of the criteria
of "public emergency." Article 15(1) of the European Convention speaks of
a "time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation
.... " By contrast, article 4, paragraph 1 of the ICCPR speaks of a "time of
public emergency which threatens the life of the nation . . . ." Finally,
article 27 of the American Convention defines a "public emergency" as a
"time of war, public danger, or other emergency that threatens the
independence or security of a State Party. . . ." Unlike the ICCPR, the two
regional conventions mention war as a circumstance that may permit
derogation from individual rights.70 There is, however, no real significance
to this difference. The controlling operative language is, therefore, "public
emergency threatening the life of the nation." War is a particular, albeit
extreme, case of such an emergency.' A crisis must be a truly extraordinary
exigency to qualify as a derogation-justifying emergency.' The derogation
Convention.
69. "It is because of the 'exceptional' nature of the threat that specific derogation clauses
have been introduced rather than relying, as might have been expected, upon ordinary limitation
provisions." L.C. Green, Book Review, 32 ALBERTA L. REv. 195, 195 (1994) (reviewing ORAA,
supra note 7).
70. The ICCPR did not refer to war because it was deemed improper and inconsistent with
both the prohibition on the use of force of article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter and the Charter's purposes
and principles. See CHOWDHURY, supra note 22, at 22 (describing decision of drafters to suppress
mention of war); ORAA, supra note 7, at 12 (same); Buergenthal, supra note 50, at 79 (same);
Partsch, supra note 52, at 328 (noting that general U.N. policy is not to mention possibility of war). It
is clear, however, that war was recognized as the most severe example of a public emergency and that
article 4 therefore fully applies to such an extreme exigency.
71. One could argue that "war" is separate from the category of "other public emergency
threatening the life of the nation" and that war consequently has an independent scope of application.
According to this line of argument, derogation may be allowed under the two regional conventions in
any circumstance of war, even if the life of the nation is not threatened-the Vietnam War may serve
as an example of such a situation. The counter-argument recognizes war as a particular kind of public
emergency. By this interpretation, the term "war" in the European and American Conventions is
superfluous. At the time of the drafting of these conventions, war had been increasingly identified with
the "total war" of World War II or with nuclear conflict. In such circumstances, it was unrealistic to
think of war as anything short of threatening the life of the nation. This argument can also be derived
from a textual reading of the relevant articles that refer to "or other public emergency" rather than
saying "or a public emergency," thus tying the term "war" to the following term of "public
emergency." In fact, one may even go further and argue that the links between war and public
emergency require that a valid public emergency be on the scale of an actual war before it can validate
derogation from individual and human rights.
Partsch implies, however, that under certain circumstances, even war should not allow a state
to resort to the derogation mechanism. Thus, "[a] big power should not be enabled to take derogating
measures after a formal declaration of war has been sent to a small 'aggressor.'" Partsch, supra note
52, at 330. Similarly, no interpretative significance is attached to the American Convention's
qualification of an emergency as one that "threatens the independence or security of a State Party,"
rather than "threatening the life of the nation." See OPAA, supra note 7, at 16. Although conceivably
broader in scope, the provision in the American Convention should not be construed as materially
different from its equivalents in the European Convention and the ICCPR. See FITZPATRICK, supra
note 39, at 56; ORAA, supra note 7, at 14-16, 27.
72. See, e.g., Buergenthal, supra note 50, at 79 (referring to "a public emergency whose
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system adopts a vision of spasms of crises-episodic and sporadic events,
albeit very serious in nature-that last for a relatively brief period of time
before the restoration of normalcy. Emphasizing the exceptional nature of
emergencies comports with the traditional paradigm regarding the
relationship between normalcy and emergency-that of "normalcy-rule,
emergency-exception."
In addition to the overarching requirement of temporary duration and
effect, several factors are considered when giving specific content to the
principle of exceptional danger.73 First, the particular crisis must be actual or
imminent.74 Derogation may not be used as a purely preventive mechanism
unless an imminent danger exists. Second, normal measures available to the
state should be manifestly inadequate and insufficient to respond effectively
to the crisis. The panoply of "normal measures" also includes those
measures available to the state in accordance with the limitation clauses that
apply in times of normalcy.75 Third, the threat must have nationwide effects.
An emergency situation whose impact is confined to certain localities cannot
satisfy the principle of exceptional danger as articulated in article 15.76 The
threat must endanger the whole population and either the entire territory of
the state or significant parts thereof.77 Finally, the emergency must threaten
seriousness is beyond doubt"). The qualification "threatening the life of the nation" was preferred to
such alternatives as "directed against the interests of the people," "gravely threatening the vital
interests of the people," "in case of exceptional danger," and "threatening the security and general
welfare of the people." See ORAA, supra note 7, at 13.
73. See, e.g., Questiaux Report, supra note 21, § 55, at 15-16.
74. See, e.g., OvAA, supra note 7, at 27-28; Hartman, supra note 14, at 16.
75. See, e.g., OPtAA, supra note 7, at 29-30 (viewing emergency measures as last resort).
76. See J.E.S. FAWCETT, THE APPLICATION OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS 308 (2d ed. 1987).
77. See Questiaux Report, supra note 21, § 55, at 15-16. A danger, whatever its gravity,
that is confined to a certain part of the state's territory and that affects neither the rest of the territory
nor the life of the nation as a whole cannot be considered a national emergency justifying the exercise
of the derogation power. Nor does a threat to a discrete segment of the population establish a threat to
"the life of the nation." See Hartman, supra note 14, at 16; see also CHOWDHURY, supra note 22, at
24-26 (arguing that emergency ought to be nationwide in its effects); OPtAA, supra note 7, at 28-29
(distinguishing between emergency in one part of territory that affects whole nation and one that is
confined in its effects only to that part of territory); Hartman, supra note 49, at 92-93 (claiming that
emergencies of limited geographic scope may occasionally justify derogation if they impair functioning
of national institutions); Richard B. Lillich, Paris Minimum Standards of Human Rights Norms in a
State of Emergency, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 1072, 1072-74 (1985) (listing Paris Standards, which define
'public emergency" as exceptional situation of crisis that affects whole population). In contrast,
Buergenthal argues that
[a] public emergency.., need not engulf or threaten to engulf an entire nation before it
can be said to 'threaten the life of the nation.' Here one must distinguish between the
magnitude and seriousness of a threat and the geographic boundaries in which the threat
appears or from which it emanates. A 'public emergency which threatens the life of the
nation' could presumably exist even if the emergency appeared to be confined to one
part of the country ... and did not threaten to spill over to other parts of the country.
A contrary interpretation is unreasonable ....
Buergenthal, supra note 50, at 80.
Alternatively, the geographical boundaries of the emergency would not necessarily determine
the existence or absence of a "public emergency threatening the life of the nation," but they might
remain relevant to the question of whether the particular emergency measures taken to fight that
emergency were "strictly required." It will be harder to show that an emergency confined to certain
territorial boundaries of one or more regions of a nation, rather than present throughout the nation,
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the very existence of the nation, that is, the "organized life of the community
constituting the basis of the State."
78
C. The Derogation Regime and the Normalcy-Emergency Dialogue
The derogation regime is premised-as the name "derogation" itself
indicates-on the aberrational nature of emergencies. The regime is a
product of the dialectic of dichotomy between normalcy and emergency.
This view separates normalcy, which is considered to be the general state of
affairs, from emergency, which is deemed the exception. The conventions
thus promote a discourse that posits normalcy and emergency as two
discrete, separable phenomena. The derogation clause lies dormant as long
as conditions are calm and tranquil. It awakens only when certain
exceptional circumstances arise, only to return to hibernation with the
subsequent return to normalcy. The basic rationale underlying this regime is
that human rights are susceptible to incursions and infringements, more so
than at any other time, during the acute pressures of emergency and crisis.
To protect these rights and prevent their dilution or nullification, it is
imperative to ensure that "emergency" and "crisis" do not become expedient
governmental tools used to facilitate the violation of individual rights. To
that end, derogation from such rights is made possible only in the most
extreme circumstances. Derogation measures last only temporarily, and their
ultimate purpose ought to be that of bringing about a rapid return to
normalcy. 79 "[A]bove and beyond the rules [that constitute the general
justifies emergency measures throughout the nation's territory.
It may be argued that the situation in Northern Ireland exemplifies this latter type of
emergency. See Schreuer, supra note 41, at 124-25 ("The recognition of a crisis situation affecting a
certain region cannot depend on the question of whether it extends to the entire nation-state, including
all other regions or provinces and, possibly, overseas territories."). Higgins finds it difficult to see the
situation in Northern Ireland as threatening the life of the whole nation, i.e., the United Kingdom-for
purposes of article 15, "the whole nation" is, in this context, Northern Ireland. See Higgins, supra
note 20, at 302. Green, on the other hand, looks to another context, the "etlnic cleansing" in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. Green argues that although this atrocious criminal activity was directed against a
particular part of the population, i.e., the Bosnian Muslims, it might be considered a threat directed at
the very existence of the Bosnian state. See Green, supra note 69, at 195-96.
78. This includes, for example, threat to the physical integrity of the population, the
territorial integrity of the state, or the continued function and operation of the fundamental organs of
the state. See, e.g., ORAA, supra note 7, at 29; Hartman, supra note 14, at 16 (positing requirement of
serious danger to some fundamental element of statehood); Draft Guidelines for the Development of
Legislation on States of Emergency, reprinted in FITZPATRICK, supra note 39, at 56 n.21 ("Even
serious disruption of the organized life of the community .. . would not constitute sufficient grounds
for a state of emergency if the disruption would not present a serious danger to the life, physical
security, or other vital interests of the population."); Daes, supra note 38, Part III, para. 42 (claiming
that although life of nation need not necessarily be threatened with actual extinction in order for there
to be legitimate recognition of "public emergency," emergency requires "a breakdown of order or
communications [such] that organized life cannot, for the time being, be maintained"); see also
CHOWDHURY, supra note 22, at 26-27 (arguing magnitude of threat must imperil institutions essential
to functioning of democratic government); Schreuer, supra note 41, at 122-23 (rejecting interpretation
of "threat to the life of the nation" as meaning threat to existing power structure).
79. See CLINTON RosSITER, CONSTrrUTIONAL DICTATORSHIP: CRISIS GOVERNMENT IN THE
MODERN DEMOCRACIES 7, 306 (1948) (arguing that return to status quo ante is only legitimate
purpose of emergency measures). But see FINN, supra note 4, at 40-43 (arguing for possibility of
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principles of the derogation system] ... one principle, namely, the principle
of provisional status, dominates all the others. The right of derogation can be
justified solely by the concern to return to normalcy."80 Thus, only a truly
extraordinary crisis that lasts for a relatively brief period of time can be a
derogation-justifying emergency. Moreover, to be legitimate, emergency
measures employed by the state must to be proportional in both degree and
duration to the particular threat.
This Article argues that the jurisprudence of the judicial institutions
operating under the European Convention reveals a substantial schism
between the theoretical discourse of the derogation regime and the reality in
which derogations actually take place. This is in large part a result of the
application of conventional theories concerning emergency regimes to
situations in which basic assumptions underlying these theories falter.
Viewing emergencies through the prism of the derogation clauses may result
in a distorted picture.
There are two major problems with the derogation model. First, a
substantial number of states of emergency in the modem world do not follow
the "normalcy-rule, emergency-exception" paradigm. Rather than
provisional and temporary emergencies, the world increasingly faces de
facto, permanent, institutionalized, or entrenched emergencies. 8 While
acknowledging the increasing occurrence of such situations, some
commentators have argued that "[i]n an increasing number of cases, the
constitutional reconstruction, as opposed to mere restoration).
80. See Questiaux Report, supra note 21, § 69, at 20; CHOWDHURY, supra note 22, at 45;
Macdonald, supra note 39, at 241-42 ("It is inherent in theory and practice that the declaration of an
emergency represents a temporary measure."). For example, derogation measures must be limited to
the duration of the particular emergency. This is explicitly recognized by the American Convention,
but it is also implied by the derogation clauses included in the European Convention and the ICCPR.
See, e.g., De Becker v. Belgium, [1962] App. No. 214/56, Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B) at 11 (Commission
report). In this case, the Belgian Government suspended the right to freedom of expression of De
Becker, who was convicted as a Nazi collaborator. Under the relevant Belgian legislation, De Becker,
a former newspaper editor, was prevented from editing, printing, and distributing newspapers or other
publications. The suspension was still in effect in 1960, fifteen years after the end of World War I1.
The Belgian government claimed that article 15 could not be construed to require that all wartime
measures automatically cease to have effect when the war ends. The Commission found that the
extension of the suspension of De Becker's rights under article 10 of the European Convention over
such a long period was not in conformity with the requirements of article 15 as it was not a
proportionate measure and that the derogating government did not claim that a situation of "public
emergency" had continued in Belgium. See id. at 133; see also Higgins, supra note 20, at 293-95
(discussing case).
81. A de facto state of emergency arises in circumstances where "there is no proclamation
or termination of the state of emergency or . . . the state of emergency subsists after it has been
officially proclaimed and then terminated." Questiaux Report, supra note 21, § 103, at 26. Permanent
emergencies include those states of emergency that are "perpetuated either as a result of de facto
systematic extension or because the Constitution has not provided any time-limit a priori." Id. § 112,
at 28. While not defining a "complex state of emergency," Questiaux finds a common feature shared
by all emergency regimes failing into this category, namely "the great number of parallel or
simultaneous emergency rules whose complexity is increased by the 'piling up' of provisions designed
to 'regularize' the immediately preceding situation and therefore embodying retroactive rules and
transitional regimes." Id. § 118, at 29. Institutionalization of emergency regimes refers to situations in
which emergencies facilitate an institutional transformation of a democratic regime into an
authoritarian or "restricted" democratic regime. See id. §§ 129-45, at 31-32.
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practices analysed seem actually to be 'deviations' from the theory of
exceptional circumstances in that they tend more and more to depart from the
'reference model' described .... ,82 It is to this point that the second
challenge to the "reference model" of the derogation regime is addressed.
Speaking of a normative "reference model"-what I have called the
"normalcy-rule, emergency-exception" paradigm-while admitting the
existence of "deviations" from that model fails to acknowledge the role
reversal between the rule and its exceptions. In fact, the "deviations" may be
more accurately characterized as the rule, while the "reference model" might
constitute a mere exception to that rule. The assumption of the exception
directs attention, in any given judicial case, to the specific attributes of the
particular emergency at hand, which loses its identity as one link in a larger
chain of emergencies or as a discrete part of a wider phenomenon of an
emergency regime.
D. Defining "Public Emergency"
1. The European Convention
The most comprehensive case law on the derogation regime is found
under the European Convention in the work of the Commission and the
Court.!,
In the Lawless case, 8' the Commission's nine-member majority defined
a "public emergency" for the purposes of article 15 of the European
Convention as "a situation of exceptional and imminent danger or crisis
affecting the general public, as distinct from particular groups, and
constituting a threat to the organised life of the community which composes
the State in question. "1 Some of the five dissenters proposed a more
rigorous reading of the term "public emergency." One alternative reading
suggested that the linkage between war and public emergency in article 15-
"[i]n time of war or other public emergency"-indicated that "public
emergency" must be construed as "tantamount to war" or as analogous to
circumstances of war.86 Another dissenting opinion suggested that a public
emergency exists only when the constitutional order of the state has
completely broken down-when the different branches of government can no
longer function. 7 The Court, however, merely affirmed the Commission's
decision without attempting to provide a definition of its own.88
82. Id. § 97, at 26.
83. For a brief review of the operation of the Court and the Commission, see infra note 283.
84. See Lawless v. Ireland, 1 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B) at 56 (1960-1961) (Commission report)
[hereinafter Lawless (Commission)]; Lawless (Court), 3 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1960-1961).
85. Lawless (Commission), 1 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B) § 90, at 82.
86. Id. § 93, at 95 (Commission member Sfisterhenn, dissenting).
87. Id. § 96, at 101 (Commission member Ermacora, dissenting).
88. The Court's theoretical treatment of this issue explained:
[]n the general context of Article 15 of the Convention, the natural and customary
meaning of the words "other public emergency threatening the life of the nation" is
sufficiently clear; ...they refer to an exceptional situation of crisis or emergency
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In the Greek case, 9 the majority of the Commission's members
identified four characteristics of a "public emergency" under article 15:
(1) It must be actual or imminent;
(2) Its effects must involve the whole nation;
(3) The continuance of the organized life of the community
must be threatened;
(4) The crisis or danger must be exceptional, in that the
normal measures or restrictions, permitted by the
Convention for the maintenance of public safety, health
and order, are plainly inadequate."
Thus, the Commission's efforts at definition remain in place because of the
Court's decision not to attempt to refine or modify these formulations.
2. The ICCPR and the American Convention
In its General Comment 5/13 on article 4 of the ICCPR, the U.N.
Human Rights Committee (Committee) indicated that an alleged emergency
will justify a derogation under that article only if the relevant circumstances
are of an exceptional and temporary nature.9 ' Furthermore, the Committee
which affects the whole population and constitutes a threat to the organised life of the
community of which the State is composed ....
Lawless (Court), 3 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) § 28, at 56.
It is interesting to note that there are two points of difference between the English text of the
Court's judgment and the French text of the decision (which was designated as the official text) with
regard to the excerpt above. While the English text refers to "an exceptional situation of crisis or
emergency," the French text reads "une situation de crise ou de danger exceptionnel et imminent."
Thus, the French text adds the notion of an "imminent emergency." The qualification "exceptional,"
which is attached in the English text to both crisis and emergency, applies, in the French version, only
to the latter.
In his concurring individual opinion, Judge Maridakis, after identifying the principle of salus
rei publicae suprema lex est as the rationale underlying article 15 of the European Convention, stated
that:
By "public emergency threatening the life of the nation" it is to be understood a quite
exceptional situation which imperils or might imperil the normal operation of public
policy established in accordance with the lawfully expressed will of the citizens, in
respect alike of the situation inside the country and of relations with foreign Powers.
Id. at 64 (Maridakis, J., concurring).
89. 1 EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, THE GREEK CASE: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION
(1969) [hereinafter The Greek Case].
90. See id. § 153, at 81. With regard to the actual or imminent character of the emergency,
the Commission noted that this imposes a limitation in time, i.e., the legitimacy of a derogation
undertaken at a certain date depends "upon there being a public emergency, actual or imminent, at that
date." Id. § 157, at 82. In a dissenting opinion, Mr. Delahaye sought to clarify that qualifying an
emergency as "actual" is superfluous, and the operative qualification ought to be only "imminent." Id.
§ 169, at 88.
Mr. Eustathiades, relying on the French text of the European Court judgment in the Lawless
case, stated in his dissenting opinion that article 15 recognizes two situations that justify derogation
from a state's obligations under the European Convention: first, a situation of exceptional and
imminent danger that affects the whole population and constitutes a threat to the organized life of the
community of which the state is composed; and second, a situation of crisis that has the same effect as
the former. See id. § 182, at 95.
91. See Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR Human Rights Comm., 36th
Sess., Annex VII, General Comment 5/13, at 110, U.N. Doe. A/36/40 (1981). Section 3 of the
General Comment provides as follows:
19981
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determined that in cases coming before it in accordance with the mechanism
set forth in the Optional Protocol, 92 the state bears the burden of showing
that these requirements have been fulfilled. 93 The principles identified in the
General Comment serve as guidelines for members of the Committee when
they examine states' reports under the procedure prescribed by article 40 of
the ICCPR. 94
Both the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights (IACHR) and
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights also have accepted the
requirement that the emergency be exceptional and temporary. In one of its
reports, the IACHR stated that under article 27 of the American Convention,
"the emergency should be of a serious nature, created by an exceptional
situation that truly represents a threat to the organised life of the State." 95
The IACHR has often expressed its opinion that governmental emergency
measures may only be carried out in "extremely serious circumstances" and
may never suspend certain fundamental rights. 96 In its advisory opinion on
Habeas Corpus in Emergency Situations,97 the Inter-American Court stated,
inter alia, that article 27 is "a provision for exceptional situations only."
9
3. Additional Definitions
Similar definitions, underscoring the provisional and exceptional nature
of "public emergencies," appear in studies prepared by international and
nongovernmental organizations. Thus, for example, a report submitted in
1982 to the U.N. Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and
Protection of Minorities refers to "states of emergency" as a generic
The Committee holds the view that measures taken under article 4 are of an exceptional
and temporary nature and may only last as long as the life of the nation concerned is
threatened and that in times of emergency, the protection of human rights becomes all
the more important, particularly those rights from which no derogations can be made.
The Committee also considers that it is equally important for States parties, in times of
public emergency, to inform the other States parties of the nature and extent of the
derogations they have made and of the reasons therefor and, further, to fulfill their
reporting obligations under article 40 of the Covenant by indicating the nature and
extent of each right derogated from together with the relevant documentation.
Id. § 3 (emphasis added).
92. For a discussion of the Optional Protocol mechanism, see FITZPATRICK, supra note 39,
at 83-114.
93. See ORAA, supra note 7, at 21.
94. See HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT:
LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 522-36 (1996). Hartman claims, however, that the Committee's
interpretation of article 4(1) of the ICCPR remains obscure due to the absence of a mechanism of
.general comments" under article 40(4). See Hartman, supra note 14, at 30.
95. ORAA, supra note 7, at 24.
96. Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Argentina, Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/ser.
L.IV./I.49, doe. 19 corr. 1, at 25-27 (1980).
97. Habeas Corpus in Emergency Situations, Advisory Opinion OC-8/87, Inter-Am. C.H.R.
17, OEA/ser. L.IV./111.17, doe 13 (1987).
98. Id. at 23. The Court also observed that "rather than adopting a philosophy that favors
the suspension of rights, the Convention establishes the contrary principle, namely, that all rights are
to be guaranteed and enforced unless very special circumstances justify the suspension of some, and
that some rights may never be suspended, however serious the emergency." Id. at 24.
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juridical term reflecting the use of emergency powers in exceptional
circumstances. "Exceptional circumstances" exist when there are
temporary factors of a generally political character which in varying degrees involve
extreme and imminent danger, threatening the organized existence of a nation, that is to
say, the political and social system that it comprises as a State, and which may be
defined as follows: "a crisis situation affecting the population as a whole and
constituting a threat to the organized existence of the community which forms the basis
of the State." . . . When such circumstances arise, then both municipal law, whatever
its theoretical basis, and international law on human rights allow the suspension of the
exercise of certain rights with the aim of rectifying the situation, and indeed protecting
the most fundamental rights.99
The International Law Association (ILA) adopted another definition of
"public emergency." For a period of eight years between 1976 and 1984, the
ILA worked to develop minimum standards for a rule of law in states of
emergency. The major result of this work is the Paris Minimum Standards of
Human Rights Norms in a State of Emergency (Paris Standards), which the
ILA Conference adopted in 1984. Article 1 of Section A of the Paris
Standards prescribes the following:
(a) The existence of a public emergency which threatens the life of the nation, and
which is officially proclaimed, will justify the declaration of a state of
emergency.
(b) The expression "public emergency" means an exceptional situation of crisis or
public danger, actual or imminent, which affects the whole population or the
whole population of the area to which the declaration applies and constitutes a
threat to the organized life of the community of which the state is composed."
In his commentary on the Paris Standards, Subrata Chowdhury
identifies the four basic elements of the definition of "public emergency" as
"(a) territorial scope; (b) magnitude of the threat; (c) provisional or
temporary status of the crisis; (d) official proclamation.".
Another definition of "public emergency" similar to that adopted by
the European Commission and Court was suggested by a group of
international law experts who convened in 1984 in Siracusa, Italy, to
formulate a list of seventy-six principles concerning the limitation and
derogation provisions in the ICCPR.'" Principles 39-41 deal with the
concept of "public emergency threatening the life of the nation":
39. A state party may take measures derogating from its obligations under the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights pursuant to Article 4
(hereinafter called "derogation measures") only when faced with a situation of
exceptional and actual or imminent danger which threatens the life of the nation.
A threat to the life of the nation is one that: affects the whole of the population
and either the whole or part of the territory of the State, and threatens the
99. Questiaux Report, supra note 21, § 23, at 8.
100. See CHOWDHURY, supra note 22, at 11.
101. Id. at 24-29.
102. THE SIRACUSA PRINCIPLES ON THE LIMITATION AND DEROGATION PROVISIONS IN THE
INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS (1984), reprinted in 7 HUM. RTS. Q. 3,
7-8 (1985).
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physical integrity of the population, the political independence or the territorial
integrity of the State or the existence or basic functioning of institutions
indispensable to ensure and protect the rights recognized in the Covenant.
40. Internal conflict and unrest that do not constitute a grave and imminent threat to
the life of the nation cannot justify derogations under Article 4.
41. Economic difficulties per se cannot justify derogation measures.'w
Im. FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF DEROGATIONS
As a matter of practice, the concept of "public emergency" came to
stand for something far less than truly exceptional circumstances threatening
the life of the nation. It has also become clear that derogation clauses only
theoretically provided objective criteria against which any particular
derogation might be compared. Experience has revealed time and again that
the European Court and Commission give great deference to the decisions of
national governments and to the manner in which those governments exercise
their discretion. The rhetoric of the Court and Commission helps to cloud
that fact but cannot hide it.
A. Early Beginnings
Gerard R. Lawless, a Dubliner, became a member of the Irish
Republican Army (IRA) in January 1956 and, according to him, left that
organization five months later. Between July 13 and December 11, 1957,
Mr. Lawless was detained without trial in a military detention camp in
County Kildare in the Republic of Ireland in accordance with the orders of
the Irish Minister of Justice under the 1939 Offences Against the State Act
(as amended in 1940). On July 8, 1957, the Irish government activated the
special powers of arrest and detention provided for in this Act following a
proclamation to that effect issued three days earlier. On July 20, the Irish
Minister for External Affairs sent a letter to the Secretary-General of the
Council of Europe, informing him of the entry into force of the special
powers of arrest and detention and notifying him of a derogation to that
extent under the provisions of article 15 of the European Convention.o4 Both
the Commission and the Court found that detaining Lawless without trial for
the five-month period in 1957 violated the obligations of the Irish
government under certain articles of the European Convention.' 5 Thus, it
became necessary to examine whether the detention could be justified under
the provisions of the derogation regime.
103. Id.; see also Daniel O'Donnell, Commentary by the Rapporteur on Derogation, 7 HuM.
RTS. Q. 23, 23-25 (1985) (restating principles).
104. Lawless (Commission), 1 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B) § 72, at 68 (1960-1961). For a
description of the factual basis of the case, see id. § 54, at 58-59; and Lawless (Court), 3 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A) §§ 15-25, at 36-40 (1960-1961).
105. The Court held that the detention violated the provisions included in articles 5 and 6 of
the European Convention but did not conflict with article 7. See Lawless (Court), 3 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(ser. A) §§ 8-22, at 46-55.
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The majority of the members of the Commission determined that a state
of public emergency had in fact existed in the Republic of Ireland as of July
5, 1957. They emphasized several factors supporting this conclusion. First,
the IRA had carried out a violent anti-British campaign in Northern Ireland,
especially since December 12, 1956,1"6 which resulted in the killings of
policemen as well as IRA volunteers and caused substantial damage to
property. 10 7 The Commission specifically noted that the IRA operated against
targets outside the Irish Republic-in Northern Ireland-and that such actions
jeopardized the Republic's relations with the United Kingdom. This was
considered no less a threat to the life of the Irish nation than the internal
threat posed by the IRA's terrorist actions within the territory of the
Republic itself. °'0 Finally, the Commission considered certain aspects of the
IRA activity in the Irish Republic." 9 It is important to note, however, that
even the majority conceded that the IRA's activities within the territory of
the Irish Republic had not affected the daily lives of the general public."0
Therefore, the Commission directed most of its attention to the IRA's
activities outside the borders of the Republic, in the six counties comprising
Northern Ireland. The aggregate of these factors led it to conclude that a
threat to the life of the Irish nation had, in fact, existed. The Commission
went on to find that threat to have been imminent."1 I
The Court, in a unanimous ruling, affirmed the Commission's opinion,
basing its judgment, as had the Commission, on a three-pronged factual
106. The Court stated:
[I]n 1957 the application of the ordinary law had proved unable to check the growing
danger which threatened the Republic of Ireland; whereas the ordinary criminal courts,
or even the special criminal courts or military courts, could not suffice to restore peace
and order; whereas, in particular, the amassing of the necessary evidence to convict
persons involved in the activities of the IRA and its splinter groups was meeting with
great difficulties ....
Id. § 36, at58.
107. Two incidents were specifically mentioned. On December 12, 1956, the IRA blew up
two bridges, an army building, and a broadcasting station, and set a courthouse and police property on
fire. On July 4, 1957, a policeman was killed and another was wounded. See Lawless (Commission), 1
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B) § 90, at 84-90; Lawless (Court), 3 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) § 14, at 35-36; id. §
29, at 56.
108. Lawless (Court), 3 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) § 14, at 35-36.
109. Among those factors were the existence, within the territory of the Republic, of an
illegal military organization that resorted to political violence to further its political agenda; the use,
by that organization, of the territory of the Republic as a base for its operations across the border in
Northern Ireland; the severe strain this organization put on the resources (both with respect to
manpower and to economic resources) of the security authorities of the Republic; attempts to interfere
with the ordinary criminal proceedings in which IRA members stood as defendants by intimidation of
judges and witnesses; and two cases in which the IRA conducted armed raids to acquire explosives
within the territory of the Republic itself. See id. §§ 14-15, 17, at 35-37.
110. See Lawless (Commission), 1 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B) § 90, at 85; see also Lawless
(Court), 3 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) § 36, at 57-58 (noting that IRA's activities mainly took place in
Northern Ireland). An exception to that general rule might have been activities in counties of the Irish
Republic bordering on Northern Ireland.
111. In coming to this conclusion, the majority members emphasized the seriousness of the
violent incidents of July 4, 1957, and that most of the IRA prisoners held by the Republic were due to
be released during July 1957. The fact that those events happened in the first half of the month of July
undoubtedly played a significant role in the decision of the Irish government to proclaim a state of
emergency in the Republic.
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finding: the existence of an illegal and secret military organization operating
within the territory of the Irish Republic that resorted to violent actions to
further its goals; the detrimental impact of this organization's operations on
the foreign relations of the Republic due to its activities in Northern Ireland;
and finally, the "steady and alarming" escalation in the intensity and scale of
its terrorist campaign from the autumn of 1956 through the first six months
of 1957.112 Like the Commission, the Court placed special significance on
the IRA's fatal attacks in Northern Ireland on the night of July 3-4 and on
the proximity of these attacks to the beginning of the Orange marching
season."' These factors "had brought to light . . . the imminent danger to
the nation caused by the continuance of unlawful activities in Northern
Ireland by the IRA and various associated groups, operating from the
territory of the Republic of Ireland. "114
The dissenting members of the Commission formulated their opinions
around several common themes. They claimed, for example, that the facts as
laid out by the majority did not demonstrate the existence of a threat to the
life of the whole nation. At most, the threat posed by these activities had
been local, affecting the life of certain segments of the public but not the life
of the public as a whole.115 Moreover, the dissenters asserted, this danger did
not rise to the level of a "public emergency" allowing derogation from
individual rights enumerated in the European Convention. At most, it
threatened the public order or safety of the Republic and thus supported only
limiting rights under the terms of the various limitation clauses of the
Convention.116 Finally, the dissenters argued, the threat had been merely
potential, rather than actual or imminent as the derogation clause required." 7
It is indeed questionable whether the IRA posed a real threat to the life
of the Irish nation during the relevant time period."' The existence of a state
112. See Lavless (Court), 3 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) § 28, at 56. It is remarkable that the
portion of the Court's decision concerning the question of the existence of a public emergency
threatening the life of the nation is less than two pages long.
113. See id. § 29, at 56. July 12 is the traditional marching day for the Protestant "Orange
Lodges" in Northern Ireland. The marches are normally accompanied by an upsurge in sectarian
violence.
114. Id. § 28, at 56.
115. Seeid. §28, at56.
116. See id.
117. See Laivless (Commission), 1 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B) § 93, at 97-98 (1960-1961)
(Commission member Sfisterhenn, dissenting); see also FRANCIS G. JACOBS & ROBIN C.A. WHITE,
THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 112 (2d ed. 1996) (differentiating between actual and
potential threats).
118. Is the fact that the Commission split so sharply over the question of the existence of a
public emergency sufficient per se to demonstrate that no real emergency situation did, in fact, exist?
The argument would go as follows: It is accepted by both majority and minority members that a public
emergency arises only in the most exceptional circumstances. This seems to indicate that the existence
of a public emergency must be a clearly recognized factor accepted by anyone who evaluates the
situation. Yet, in this case, the existence of a public emergency in the Irish Republic was not clear to
five of the Commission members.
This issue raises questions of formal logic and may be disposed of through the use of deontic
logic separating the statement "it is obvious that X" from the statement "it is obvious that it is obvious
that X." See Ron Shapira, The "Givati" Case and Common Sense, 1 ISR. J. CRIM. JUST. 121, 122-25
(1990). Whereas an emergency (X) may only be recognized to exist in truly exceptional
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of emergency was closely linked to the "continuance of unlawful activities in
Northern Ireland by the IRA." Northern Ireland, however, was neither part
of the Irish Republic's territory nor under its control. The IRA's terrorist
activities across the border did not threaten the life of the Republic and
affected the day-to-day lives of its citizens only marginally, if at all. In short,
the events in the North had no real spillover effect into the territory of the
Republic. Of course, it could be imagined that continued terrorist activity
might lead to such actions as closure of the border between the North and the
Republic or might otherwise detrimentally impact Anglo-Irish relations. Yet,
even assuming that such effects could be considered a "public emergency,"
there was no indication that they had been anything more than a remote
possibility, much less an imminent or actual threat to the normal life of the
Irish nation.
The European judicial bodies have hesitated to interfere with the
discretion of national governments in cases involving derogation from human
rights for reasons of public emergency that may detrimentally affect the life
of that nation. It comes as no surprise, then, that these institutions were
doubly reluctant to intervene in this case, which might have affected two
nations, rather than only one. It may be that the Court and the Commission
chose to emphasize the potential harmful effects on the foreign relations of
the Republic of Ireland and on its good neighborly relationship with the
United Kingdom, although this issue was not before either the Commission
or the Court in this case.
Moreover, as at least one judge openly acknowledged, by July 1957 the
IRA terrorist campaign was winding down.119 The Court praised the
government's success in "using means available under ordinary legislation,
in keeping public institutions functioning more or less normally" until the
IRA carried out its murderous attack on the night of July 3, 1957.120 Was
that attack, in and of itself, sufficient to justify resort to derogation? Did the
potentially explosive combination of this attack and the annual Orange
processions support Lawless's continued detention without trial, even when
the marching season was over? Finally, if indeed the fear that releasing
persons such as Lawless at that time might lead to further violence was well-
founded, why did the Irish government offer Lawless release as early as July
16, "provided he gave an undertaking in writing 'to respect the Constitution
and laws of Ireland' and not to 'be a member of or assist any organisation
which is an unlawful organisation under the Offences against the State Act,
1939,'" an offer that he declined?"2 Surely, if his detention were necessary
circumstances, a judicial organ may deliberate at length and its members may disagree whether such
truly exceptional circumstances occurred. The mere fact of deliberation and disagreement does not
detract, in and of itself, from the validity of the finding that an emergency did actually exist.
119. See Lawless (Court), 3 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 65 (1960-1961) (individual opinion of
Judge Maridakis). The last IRA terrorist act carried out in Northern Ireland before the attack on the
night of July 3 (which apparently was the direct and immediate cause for the derogation measures
undertaken by the Irish government) was on the night of April 25-26.
120. Id. § 29, at 56.
121. See id. § 21, at 39.
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to prevent further terrorist activity in Northern Ireland, his written pledge
would not have served as an insurmountable barrier against his participating
in, or assisting, such activity in the future.
The Lawless decision has been widely praised for the willingness
demonstrated by both the Commission and the Court to review on the merits
the question of whether a situation of public emergency did exist that would
allow a state to use the power of derogation set out in article 15.122 Both
rejected the proposition that the resolution of such an issue ought to be left to
the sole discretion of the state-a significant decision indeed, especially in
light of the fact that Lawless was the first case to come before the Court.
Indeed, at the time, neither the Court nor the Commission had yet
established their status vis-A-vis the states parties to the European
Convention. As a result, neither institution enjoyed sufficient confidence to
interfere with the government's discretion on such a sensitive issue.
It is somewhat tempting to compare the Lawless decision with the U.S.
Supreme Court's opinion in Marbury v. Madison.'23 In that case, the
Supreme Court asserted its power of constitutional judicial review; in
Lawless, the European Court established its jurisdiction to review
independently derogation claims and measures. Both decisions coated
doctrinal boldness with a specific result upholding the claims of the
government.'24 Unlike Marbury v. Madison, however, Lawless has not
signaled the dawn of an active judicial review by the European Court and
Commission, for reasons to be found in the judgment itself. Most
importantly, both the Court's ruling and the Commission's majority opinion
emphasized the dual requirements of temporal duration and exceptional
nature in identifying a "public emergency." When applying these criteria,
however, both institutions gave the national government wider leeway than a
strict interpretation of these fundamental principles would have demanded.
While their rhetoric reinforced the notion of emergencies as temporary and
exceptional situations, their decisions substantially undermined the
significance of the principle of exceptional danger. Indeed, the Court and
Commission similarly relaxed the "temporariness" requirement in later
opinions. In that respect, perhaps more than in any other, the Lawless
decisions have set the tone for future dealings with governmental invocation
of the power to derogate.
For reasons explained above, neither the Court nor the Commission
chose to stand up to the Irish government. Yet precisely because both
122. "[l]t is for the Court to determine whether the conditions laid down in Article 15 for the
exercise of the exceptional right of derogation have been fulfilled in the present case[.]" Id. § 22, at
55. The Commission first established its competence to review and rule on the compliance of a
derogating state with its obligations under article 15 in Greece v. United Kingdom, 1958-1959 Y.B.
Eur. Cony. on H.R. 174 (Eur. Comm'n on H.R.).
123. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 1 (1803). For a favorable view of the European Court's judgment,
see, for example, Harold F. Porter, Jr., The Lawless Case: A Beachhead for Civil Rights, 49 A.B.A.
J. 79 (1963).
124. See Fionnuala Ni Aolain, The Emergence of Diversity: Differences in Human Rights
Jurisprudence, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 101, 111 (1995).
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adopted the rhetoric"as of judicial activism, their decisions carried significant
legitimating value for the actions of that government. 26 Thus, in Lawless,
both the Court and the Commission undermined their jurisdiction
independently to review and determine the legitimacy of a derogation
decision and the measures following it-thus sowing the seeds of their own
ineffectuality. 7 Although they have not completely abdicated their judicial
review responsibility to decide a derogation case on its merits, the European
human rights bodies have adopted a markedly deferential attitude toward the
national governments as to whether a "public emergency" exists.
The main tool of judicial deference has been the doctrine of the
"margin of appreciation,"' 28 which the Commission first adopted in the
(First) Cyprus case"' when it stated that a state exercising the derogation
power under the European Convention enjoyed "a certain measure of
discretion in assessing the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the
situation." 3° This "measure of discretion" applied only to the second
constitutive element of article 15, namely, that the emergency measures
taken by that government be limited to the extent strictly required by the
exigencies. It was not mentioned in the context of the existence of a "public
emergency threatening the life of the nation."'
The Commission extended the notion of a measure of discretion in the
Lawless case, applying it not only to the question of whether the measures
taken by the government were "strictly required" by the exigencies but also
to the determination of whether a "public emergency threatening the life of
the nation" existed. Thus, it stated:
[H]aving regard to the high responsibility which a government has to its people to
protect them against any threat to the life of the nation, it is evident that a certain
discretion-a certain margin of appreciation-must be kept to the Government in
determining whether there exists a public emergency which threatens the life of the
nation and which must be dealt with by exceptional measures derogating from its
125. See Frederick Schauer, Community, Citizenship, and the Search for National Identity, 84
MICH. L. REV. 1504, 1506 (1986).
126. See ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 29-31 (1962); see also
Ronen Shamir, "Landmark Cases" and the Reproduction of Legitimacy: The Case of Israel's High
Court of Justice, 24 L. & Soc'Y REv. 781, 781 (1990) (claiming that decisions that counter some
governmental practices allow courts to confer legitimacy on other governmental policies).
127. See Ni Aolain, supra note 124, at 112 (stating that "judicial deference to the states'
assessment of risk . . . was the stumbling block created and followed with only one exception in
subsequent derogation cases").
128. The concept of "margin of appreciation" is derived from French administrative law. See
FRANCIS G. JACOBS, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 201 (1975); HOWARD C.
YOUROW, THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION DOCTRINE IN THE DYNAMICS OF EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS
JURISPRUDENCE 30 (1993).
129. Greece v. United Kingdom, 1958-1959 Y.B. Eur. Cony. on HR. 174 (Eur. Comm'n on
H.R.). In this case Greece brought an application against the United Kingdom alleging that the latter
violated its obligations under the European Convention by resorting to such measures as whipping,
detention without trial, and deportation in Cyprus. In its response, the United Kingdom pointed out
that it invoked the derogation clause of the Convention and claimed that the circumstances prevailing
in Cyprus at the time amounted to a "public emergency threatening the life of the nation." Id. at 174.
130. Id. at 176.
131. See, e.g., The Greek Case, supra note 89, §§ 180-184, at 92-99 (Commission member
Eustathiades, dissenting) (analyzing two constitutive questions falling under article 15 cases).
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normal obligations under the Convention132
A minority of the Commission members adamantly rejected the margin
of appreciation doctrine, arguing that evaluation of the existence of a public
emergency ought to be based solely on existing facts without regard to any
"account of subjective predictions as to future development." 3  The
dissenters insisted that the Commission should review de novo the existence
of a public emergency in a given situation.
3 4
Although the Court made no specific mention of the margin of
appreciation doctrine in Lawless,1 3 1 its opinion contains similar language. For
example, the Court concluded that "the existence at the time of a 'public
emergency threatening the life of the nation', was reasonably deduced by the
Irish Government from a combination of several factors .... 3 6
By using this doctrine, the Commission and the Court weakened the
limitations that the principle of exceptional danger could otherwise be
expected to put on governmental exercise of the power to derogate. While
public emergency became a somewhat less exceptional, less aberrational
phenomenon, the rhetorical adherence to the "normalcy-rule, emergency-
exception" paradigm helped disguise that aspect of the case, which would
remain dormant for some two decades before rearing its head again.
132. Lawless (Commission), 1 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B) § 90, at 82 (1960-1961). Sir Humphrey
Waldock explained the notion of the margin of appreciation in these words:
The question of whether or not to employ exceptional powers under Article 15 involves
problems of appreciation and timing for a Government which may be most difficult,
and especially difficult in a democracy. . . .The Commission recognises that the
Government has to balance the ills involved in a temporary restriction of fundamental
rights against even worse consequences then for the people and perhaps larger
dislocation than of fundamental rights and freedoms, if it is to put the situation right
again .... Article 15 has to be read in the context of the rather special subject-matter
with which it deals: the responsibilities of a Government for maintaining law and order
in a time of war or any other public emergency threatening the life of the nation. The
concept of the margin of appreciation is that a Government's discharge of these
responsibilities is essentially a delicate problem of appreciating complex factors and of
balancing conflicting considerations of the public interest; and that, once the
Commission or the Court is satisfied that the Government's appreciation is at least on
the margin of the powers conferred by Article 15, then the interest which the public
itself has in effective Government and in the maintenance or order justifies and requires
a decision in favour of the legality of the Government's appreciation.
Id. at 395-96, 408 (Verbatim Report of the Public Hearing Held by the Chamber of the Court on 7th,
8th, 10th, and 11th April, 1961).
133. Id. § 92, at 94, (Commission member Eustathiades, dissenting). Furthermore, the same
Commission member suggested that fears entertained by the Irish government that the situation in the
Republic might degenerate had no foundation in fact as there had been no apparent intensification in
the activities of the IRA during the relevant period. See id. at 134-42 (stating that emergency in
Ireland was not threat to life of nation but only threat to public order) (Commission member
Eustathiades, dissenting).
134. The same position was also entertained by the dissenting members of the Commission
with respect to the question of whether the measures taken by the Irish government were "strictly
required" or not. See id. at 135-36 (Commission member Eustathiades, dissenting); id. at 152-53
(Commission member Sfisterhenn, dissenting).
135. See Higgins, supra note 20, at 298.
136. Lawless (Court), 3 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) § 28, at 56 (emphasis added). With respect to
the issue of the proportionality of the measures taken by the government, however, the Court seemed
to engage in an independent evaluation of possible alternatives.
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B. A New Direction?
By the end of the 1960s it seemed that the strong rhetorical statements
in Lawless rather than the inherent weaknesses in that judgment had carried
the day. In that year, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and the Netherlands
brought a case before the Commission claiming that the Greek government
had violated the European Convention.'37 That government, a nondemocratic
military junta that came to power after violently overthrowing the
constitutional government in April 1967,138 suspended certain provisions of
the Greek Constitution that corresponded to various articles of the European
Convention. By a ten to five majority, the Commission rejected the Greek
government's arguments and decided that no public emergency existed in
Greece at the time derogation occurred.39
137. See James Beckett, The Greek Case Before the European Human Rights Commission, 1
HuM. RTs. 91, 93 (1970-1971). The case never came before the European Court. The Commission
delivered its report to the Committee of Ministers in November 1968. The Committee adopted a
resolution that made public the Commission's report. Upon the adoption of this resolution, the Greek
government denounced the European Convention in December 1969 and withdrew its membership in
the Convention. Greece was not readmitted as a member until 1974. See id. at 93-117 (describing two
years Commission spent on Greek case).
138. See id. at 93-94.
139. The Greek government identified the "public emergency threatening the life of the
nation" existing in Greece as the threat of a violent Communist overthrow of the military government,
a crisis of constitutional government, and a crisis of public order. The Commission concluded that the
evidence supplied by the government to support the claim of an "imminent threat of a Communist
displacement of the lawful Government by force of arms" was not persuasive. The main evidence
consisted of small caches of low quality arms discovered by the government-fewer than 150 rifles
and machine guns were so discovered. With regard to these arms, the Commission noted that the
overwhelming majority of the rifles seized by the government were in a state of "semi-destruction."
Thus, the arms caches were described by the Commission as "negligible in size and quality." The
government's evidence also included the discovery of a "General Plan of Action" which supposedly
outlined the plan for seizure of power by the Communists, but which, according to the Commission,
did not indicate any imminent overthrow of the government. See The Greek Case, supra note 89, §§
98-115, at 55-62; § 159, at 82-84. The Commission suggested that "[t]he fact that the respondent
Government, having had full access to all available information, whether published, official or secret,
has been able to produce only . . . very slender evidence ... itself demonstrates that no Communist
take-over of government by force of arms was to be anticipated." Id. § 159, at 84. The Commission
concluded further that, not only did the Greek government not show that the threat of a Communist
coup was imminent, the evidence actually indicated that a violent takeover was "neither planned at that
time, nor seriously anticipated by either the military or police authorities." Id. § 159, at 83.
The Commission also rejected the claim that the circumstances prevailing in Greece on and
before April 21 (the Greek government made claims going back to May 1944) constituted a
constitutional crisis that put public order in serious jeopardy. The Commission acknowledged the
existence in April 1967 of a "widespread anxiety about the future of political institutions in Greece and
the ability of governments to maintain public order and social progress." Id. § 126, at 67. However,
the Commission noted that there was "no conclusive evidence" that any of the parties campaigning for
the May elections had proposed to abolish the Parliament or substantially to limit its powers.
Furthermore, the Commission noted that the Communist party consistently lost electoral power in
successive elections. This led to doubts as to whether, in April 1967, the formation of a Popular Front
government after the May elections was certain or even likely. Finally, much of the evidence
submitted to the Commission to support the claims of the government under this heading referred to
events that allegedly took place in 1964 through 1965. This evidence, the Commission stated, was
irrelevant to the question of whether an actual or imminent emergency existed in Greece in April
1967. At least one document relied on by the government was a forgery and was declared as such by a
Greek tribunal prior to its submission to the Commission. See id. §§ 126-132, at 67-71; §§ 163-164,
at 85-86.
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The Greek case is unique among the derogation cases. It was the first,
and so far the only, decision in which a European judicial organ rejected a
government's contention that a state of "public emergency threatening the
life of the nation" existed. The case reversed the relationship between
rhetoric and practice. Although it professed respect for the "constant
jurisprudence" concerning the margin of appreciation doctrine, the
Commission did not grant any such margin to the Greek revolutionary
government in what constituted a virtual de novo review of the factual basis
of the case and the Greek government's submissions.14° In fact, the
Commission engaged in independent factfinding activity.14' Furthermore, the
Commission stated that a state derogating from human rights under article 15
bears the burden of showing that a public emergency exists. 4 With that
statement, the approach of the Commission came close to that of the Lawless
dissent, insofar as it undertook an objective and critical evaluation of the
facts.
While the Greek case seemed a bold decision, one cannot disregard the
fact that the specific circumstances of this case made the Commission's job
relatively easy. First, the respondent state was at the time controlled by a
nondemocratic regime-anathema to all that the European Convention
represented."' Politically, no other member state supported it. Its
The Greek government further argued that, since 1965, the country had come close to a state of
anarchy. It specifically cited frequent violent demonstrations, activities, and strikes in which hundreds
of policemen and civilians were killed or injured. The Commission conceded that great tension existed
in Athens and Salonica, particularly among students and building workers, and that at least one
demonstration resulted in serious violence. Id. §§ 141-51, at 75-79. However, the Commission
nonetheless found that "there [was] no evidence that the police were not in both cities fully able to
cope with the situation; there [was] no indication that firearms were used or their use planned and still
less was there any suggestion that the army should be called in to assist the police." Id. § 149, at 78-
79. Thus, the government "was in effective control of the situation." Id. § 160, at 84.
It is interesting to note that the Commission, appointed under article 26 of the Constitution of
the International Labor Organization, dealt with a complaint against the Greek government for alleged
violations of the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize Convention, and the
Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining Convention. The Commission concluded that the
evidence presented to it did not support a conclusion that exceptional circumstances existed in Greece
in 1967 that could justify a temporary violation of the two conventions by the state. See Questiaux
Report, supra note 21, at § 57.
140. The majority opinion was careful, however, to pay at least a lip-service to "the 'margin
of appreciation' which, according to the constant jurisprudence of the Commission, the Government
has in judging the situation in Greece as from the moment it assumed power on 21st April, 1967." The
Greek Case, supra note 89, § 154, at 81.
On the two dissenting judgments in relation to this matter, see Cora S. Feingold, The Doctrine
of Margin of Appreciation and the European Convention on Human Rights, 53 NOTREP DAME L. REV.
90, 93-94 (1977).
141. See A.H. ROBERTSON & J.G. MERRILLS, HUMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPE: A STUDY OF THE
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 278 (3d ed. 1993). See generally HARRIS ET AL., supra
note 29, at 596-97 (describing Commission's powers of investigation including on-site visits).
142. See The Greek Case, supra note 89, § 154, at 81.
143. In this context, article 17 of the European Convention states:
Nothing in this Convention may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or
person any right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of
any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein or at their limitation to a greater extent
than is provided for in the Convention.
European Convention, supra note 16, art. 17.
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nondemocratic nature made it easier for the Commission to assume an
uncompromising stance: Not only would such a decision enjoy moral and
political support, but it would be easily distinguishable from any future case
involving a democratic regime, thus alleviating member states' fears that a
strong decision might be used against them in the future."4 It has been noted
that "[w]here ostensibly democratic states have engaged in the suspension of
certain rights guaranteed under the Convention, the Commission and Court
are less exacting in their requirements." 45 In the Greek case, the danger
perceived by the respondent government was posed by those who challenged
the unconstitutional seizure of power. It was clear that the military regime's
sense of urgency had resulted, to a large extent, from its desire to retain
power and block a return to a constitutional democratic order. In Lawless, on
the contrary, derogation was deemed necessary to combat an illegal military
organization that had resorted to violence against a lawful government.
Insofar as the Commission's decision opposed the self-proclaimed interests
of the Greek junta, it was all the more palatable to established regimes, as it
worked against an unconstitutional overthrow of a lawful government.
Second, the relevant state in this case was relatively marginalized in Europe.
The possible repercussions of a Commission ruling against such a country
could not have been overly detrimental to maintaining the structure of the
European Convention. Finally, the case involved a governmental derogation
from a wide range of individual rights rather than merely the administrative
detention and interrogation of detainees of Lawless.'
Thus, while there is much to be said in support of the final outcome of
the Greek case, it did not test, in any meaningful way, the Commission's
attitude toward the twin issues of temporal duration and the exceptional
nature of situations constituting public emergencies.
C. Back to the Future: The Parsing of a Prolonged Emergency
In the case of Ireland v. United Kingdom,'47 the parties did not dispute
the existence of an emergency situation in Northern Ireland.' On August 9,
1971, the British government reintroduced into Northern Ireland such
measures as detention and internment under the Civil Authorities (Special
Powers) Act (Northern Ireland) 1922,' and regulations issued pursuant to
it. 50 At least some of the detainees were subjected to the "five techniques"-
144. See Beckett, supra note 137, at 113; Hartman, supra note 14, at 29; Ni Aolain, supra
note 124, at 114.
145. Ni Aolain, supra note 124, at 114.
146. See Schreuer, supra note 41, at 126-27.
147. Ireland v. United Kingdom, 1976 Y.B. Eur. Cony. on H.R. (Eur. Comm'n on H.R.).
148. See id. See generally Michael O'Boyle, Torture and Emergency Powers Under the
European Convention on Human Rights: Ireland v. The United Kingdom, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 674
(1977) (analyzing Commission's treatment of human rights in Ireland v. United Kingdom).
149. Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act, 1922, 12 & 13 Geo. 5 (N. Ir.).
150. On August 9, 1971, the government of Northern Ireland brought into operation various
special powers permitting the arrest and detention or internment without trial of large numbers of
persons. The arrests took place under the Special Powers Act and Regulation 10 thereunder. By virtue
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hooding, standing against a wall, subjection to noise, deprivation of food and
water, and deprivation of sleep-during their interrogation."'
The Irish government contended that the detention and internment
without trial violated articles 5 and 6 of the European Convention.'52 It also
argued that these measures were not "strictly required by the exigencies of
the situation"153 and that the British government's detention and internment
policy discriminated against Northern Ireland's minority Catholic
community."5 4 Finally, the Irish claimed that the use of the five techniques
violated the British government's obligations under article 3 of the European
Convention, which is included in the list of the non-derogable rights.' 5
The Commission concluded that, as implemented under the domestic
emergency legislation, the powers of detention and internment without trial
did, in fact, violate the provisions of article 5 of the European Convention.'56
Thus, it then had to examine whether these measures could be justified under
article 15. On this question, the Commission was unanimous in determining
that at any point during the period relevant to the case, detention without
trial was indeed "strictly required by the exigencies of the situation.""'
of this regulation, a person could be arrested and held in custody for 48 hours for interrogation. Under
regulation 11(1), a person could be arrested for the same purpose with no apparent time limit. The
detention operation was based on intelligence information gathered by the Royal Ulster Constabulary
(RUC), much of which was dated or inaccurate, resulting in the arrest of many persons wholly
unconnected with paramilitary activities. In the first few hours of the operation, 342 people were
arrested for suspected connections with the IRA. By December 14, 1971, some 1576 people were
arrested while 934 were released. See Ireland, 1976 Y.B. Eur. Cony. on H.R. at 670-84; FINN, supra
note 4, at 68-69, 70; David R. Lowry, Internment: Detention Without Trial in Northern Ireland, 5
HUM. RTs. 261, 274 (1976).
151. Ireland, 1976 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. at 513.
152. See id. at 528-30, 536-38, 542.
153. Id. at 544.
154. See id. at 604, 610-12.
155. See id. at 738-42.
156. See id. at 578-80.
157. Id. at 602. Hartman criticizes the Commission's approach as failing to scrutinize closely
the issue of proportionality by examining the British approach, rather than examining the measures
taken by the government phase by phase. See Hartman, supra note 14, at 33. "Ihe principle of
proportionality must not be the subject of an over-all assessment in abstracto .... The 'in concreto'
assessment [results in] . . . analysing the principle of proportionality not on an over-all basis, but
derogation by derogation and even in time and space." Questiaux Report, supra note 21, §§ 61-62, at
17. But see ORAA, supra note 7, at 150-51 (stating that separate examination of each phase of
emergency situation "should not be conducted too rigorously" because such examination may conflict
with "dynamic" evaluation of national crisis and emergency measures taken to counteract that crisis).
Hartman also deplores the Commission's failure to examine potential alternative measures and
its retreat from the "Lawless rule on safeguards." Hartman, supra note 14, at 33; see also Higgins,
supra note 20, at 304 (attacking Commission's reasoning as circular). The Commission held that the
safeguard offered by the establishment of Detention Commissions, which had been deemed significant
in Lawless, was not always necessary when detention without trial was involved. See Ireland, 1976
Y.B. Eur. Cony. on H.R. at 558. In addition, the Commission held that gradual improvements in the
safeguards offered by the state did not necessarily indicate inadequacy of former safeguards. The
Commission felt that a contrary position would discourage states from attempting to strengthen the
safeguards accompanying various derogation measures. See Ireland, 1976 Y.B. Eur. Cony. on H.R. at
600. As the Commission explained,
[t]he fact that the measures were improved with time whereas the crisis became more
grave cannot be taken to show that the measures under the Special Powers Act ever
exceeded the requirements of the situation. Experience must allow improvements to be
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Again by a unanimous vote, however, the Commission concluded that
the combined use of the five techniques during the interrogations of several
detainees amounted to torture within the meaning of article 3 of the
European Convention.158 For its part, the Court refused to rule that each of
the five techniques amounted to "torture," instead labeling each of them
"inhuman or degrading treatment."159
While worthy of some praise, the significance of the Commission's
unanimous decision on the five techniques is also somewhat qualified. First,
the Commission handed down its decision long after the government of the
United Kingdom prohibited any further use of the five techniques in
interrogations. 6 Furthermore, although the British government had
announced that it did not plan to challenge the Commission's findings on this
point, '6 the Court decided that the five techniques did not constitute
prohibited torture but only inhuman treatment. 62 In coming to this decision,
the Court declined Ireland's invitation to examine the five techniques as a
made by a Government without its afterwards being held guilty of having violated the
Convention. Otherwise this possibility might even conceivably impede the improvement
of the safeguards as experience was gained.
Id. This "dynamic" approach leaves room for "progressive adaptations of the derogating measures
and safeguards." ORAA, supra note 7, at 150; Higgins, supra note 20, at 304; Schreuer, supra note
41, at 128-29.
Another strong challenge to the Commission's decision concerns its failure to examine both the
link between the claim that the derogation measures exercised by the British government in Northern
Ireland were applied in a discriminatory fashion and the question of whether those measures were
"strictly necessary." See Hartman, supra note 14, at 34. Detention without trial had been employed
almost exclusively against members of the Catholic community in Northern Ireland. Protestant
terrorists continued to be brought before the ordinary criminal courts, despite a significant increase in
acts of violence committed by Protestant paramilitary groups. Though there was no clear showing why
the ordinary criminal courts were adequate to deal with Protestant but not with Catholic terrorism, the
European Commission and the Court decided that the emergency measures taken by the British
government in Northern Ireland had not been applied in an impermissibly discriminatory manner.
Several factors justified this holding: the greater number of terrorist attacks perpetrated by the IRA as
opposed to the Unionists; the more substantial risk posed by IRA terrorism because of its well-
structured hierarchical organization; and the relative ease of carrying out criminal proceedings against
loyalist paramilitaries as against IRA members. Moreover, as the conflict progressed and the British
gained more experience, the treatment of the warring groups became more equal. See generally KEviN
BOYLE ET AL., TEN YEARS IN NORTHERN IRELAND: THE LEGAL CONTROL OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE
(1980) (describing developments in criminal procedure in Northern Ireland in 1970s).
158. See Ireland, 1976 Y.B. Eur. Cony. on H.R. at 794. The Commission further decided
that certain other forms of ill-treatment alleged to have been used by the security forces against
detainees amounted to inhuman treatment of those detainees in violation of article 3 of the Convention.
See id. at 930.
159. See Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) §§ 167-168, at 66-67 (1978).
160. On March 2, 1972, the British government prohibited further use of the "interrogation
in depth" techniques by its security forces. On July 26, 1976, a new Headquarters Directive on
Terrorist Suspects was issued that prohibited the use of the five techniques. See ANTONIO VERCHER,
TERRORISM IN EUROPE 67 (1992).
161. See Lesley C. Green, Derogation of Human Rights in Emergency Situations, 16 CAN.
Y.B. INT'L L. 92, 99 (1978).
162. See Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) §§ 167-168, at 66-67
(holding, by thirteen votes to four, that use of techniques did not constitute torture as they did not
cause suffering of particular intensity and cruelty implied by word "torture"); see also id. § 165, at 66
("Mhe applicant government ask[s] for confirmation of... [the Commission's opinion that the five
techniques constituted torture] which is not contested before the Court by the respondent
government.").
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whole and to assess their aggregate effect, preferring instead to review each
technique separately, as if it were unrelated to other measures employed
during interrogations.
6 3
Second, and more important to the thesis of this Article, although the
Republic of Ireland did not contest the existence of a "public emergency
threatening the life of the nation" in Northern Ireland at the relevant times,
the Commission affirmatively found that such an emergency did, in fact,
exist."64 The parties' stipulation to the presence of an emergency situation
cannot exempt the Commission and the Court from independently reviewing
this question. The European Convention protects individual rights that states
cannot waive or forgo; therefore, the Commission properly made an
independent assessment of the situation in Northern Ireland.'65 It is the
substance of its decision on this point that is troubling.
The circumstances of the Northern Irish conflict, so well depicted by
the Commission in its report, strongly challenge the fundamental premises
upon which the derogation system is based. The continuous crisis in that area
stands in stark contrast to the notion that a state of "public emergency" is an
exceptional phenomenon-a temporary deviation from the normal state of
affairs-and that a government's use of emergency measures should seek to
restore normalcy in as speedy a manner as possible. Emergency has not been
the exception in Northern Ireland; it has been the norm. 66 "Normalcy" is an
empty phrase when it stands for constant fear, bars on windows and doors,
army patrols in residential areas, frequent arrests of young people, ongoing
terrorist campaigns, and large numbers of casualties. In these circumstances,
how can the emergency be considered anything but a permanent situation
that, although varying in intensity, is a constant feature of day-to-day life?
The Commission in fact began its report by stating that "[t]he lasting crisis
in Northern Ireland gave rise to the present application . . . .The present
163. For a critical assessment of this approach, see FAWCETT, supra note 76, at 45-46; and
Ni Aolain, supra note 124, at 116-17 ("MIhe examination of the specific measures was characterized
by the manipulation of categories as a tool to avoid specific scrutiny of the net effect of the techniques
used .... The combined effect of utilizing more than one technique on detainees was lost .... ").
164. As the Commission explained its position:
The Commission is satisfied that there existed in Northern Ireland at all times material
for the present case a public emergency threatening the life of the nation within the
meaning of Art. 15. The degree of violence, with bombing, shooting and rioting was on
a scale far beyond what could be called minor civil disorder. It is clear that the violence
used was in many instances planned in advance, by factions of the community organised
and acting on para-military lines. To a great extent the violence was directed against the
security forces which were severely hampered in their function to keep or restore the
public peace. The existence of an emergency within the meaning of Art. 15 is not in
dispute between the parties.
Ireland, 1976 Y.B. Eur. Cony. on H.R. at 584-86.
165. See id. at 608, 630-702.
166. See Kevin Boyle, Human Rights and Political Resolution in Northern Ireland, 9 YALE J,
WORLD PUB. ORDER 156, 175 (1982) ("The concept of an emergency gives rise to the expectation that
such a state of affairs is temporary . . . . In Northern Ireland, however, there can be no such
expectation .... Normal conditions will not be restored .... Instead, normal conditions will have to
be built from the ground up."). See generally DERMOT P.J. WALSH, THE USE AND ABusE OF
EMERGENCY LEGISLATION IN NORTHERN IRELAND (1983) (providing discussion of arrest,
interrogation, and operation of courts based on court surveys and interview survey).
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emergency is not as such in dispute between the parties. It began in 1966
with the first use of violence for political ends in Northern Ireland in recent
years."167 It is difficult-indeed, impossible-to reconcile this statement with
the Commission and Court definitions of "public emergency threatening the
life of the nation." The situation in Northern Ireland contradicts the very
foundation of the derogation regime as expressed in the concept of
"normalcy-rule, emergency-exception." Yet neither the Commission nor the
Court acknowledged the strain that such a "prolonged crisis" put on the
derogation regime. Similarly, neither institution addressed the fact that Great
Britain has practically maintained an ongoing derogation notice with respect
to Northern Ireland.168 That, too, ran against the theoretical underpinnings of
the derogation system. In short, in this case, the Court and Commission's
insistence on viewing issues pertaining to derogation under article 15 through
the false mirror of theoretical definitions prevented them from realizing that
they faced a completely different situation. As a result, they tried to impose
the straitjacket of the derogation regime on circumstances that called for
different treatment.
Third, the decisions in Ireland v. United Kingdom have further
contributed to the expansion of the problematic margin of appreciation
doctrine. The Court pushed the doctrine forward by declaring that
[i]t falls in the first place to each Contracting State, with its responsibility for "the life
of [its] nation," to determine whether that life is threatened by a "public emergency"
and, if so, how far it is necessary to go in attempting to overcome the emergency. By
reason of their direct and continuous contact with the pressing needs of the moment, the
national authorities are in principle in a better position than the international judge to
decide both on the presence of such an emergency and on the nature and scope of
derogations necessary to avert it. In this matter article 15 paragraph 1 leaves those
authorities a wide margin of appreciation. Nevertheless, the States do not enjoy an
unlimited power in this respect. The Court, which, with the Commission, is responsible
for ensuring the observance of the States engagements (article 19), is empowered to
rule on whether the States have gone beyond the "extent strictly required by the
exigencies" of the crisis . . . . The domestic margin of appreciation is thus
accompanied by a European supervision.169
D. Trees and Forest
The dissonance between the theoretical premises underlying the
derogation regime and the reality of continuous conflict continued to be
167. Ireland, 1976 Eur. Cony. on H.R. at 512 (emphasis added).
168. See infra note 204.
169. Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) § 207, at 78-79. The Commission
in this case did not make any specific mention of the margin of appreciation doctrine. It recognized,
however, that
both the direct requirements of the emergency and the more indirect considerations as
to how the emergency procedures should be organised in relation to normal processes
of law, must be in the first place determined by the State concerned, unless the
Commission finds that the reasons given cannot, even in the circumstances, justify the
extent of derogation.
Ireland, 1976 Y.B. Eur. Cony. on H.R. at 598. What the Commission's process of "finding" entails is
not further elaborated by the decision.
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played out in the jurisprudence of the Commission and Court's post-Ireland
jurisprudence. Northern Ireland (and before 1922 the whole island of
Ireland) 7' has experienced an entrenched violent conflict.'71 Between 1969
and 1990, more than 2800 people were killed in Northern Ireland as a result
of some sort of political violence. 72 It is estimated that over 33,000 people
suffered serious injuries during approximately the same period.' The
Northern Irish conflict has also imposed a substantial financial burden on all
the parties involved. 74
The entrenched nature of the conflict is also reflected in the Northern
Irish legal system. The British government has applied special emergency
legislation to Ireland since the 1820s." In addition, the British made a
significant number of emergency powers part of Ireland's general,
permanent legislative landscape.'76 Interestingly enough, at least one analyst
traced the impetus behind this second pattern to the British government's
belief that "normality would reassert itself."'
As normality did not reassert itself and security considerations
remained a prominent part of the Northern Irish agenda,' 8 Britain continued
to apply numerous emergency legislative measures to the six counties of
Northern Ireland during the twentieth century. After violent clashes between
Protestants and Catholics caused the deaths of some 300 people within two
years,'79 the government introduced the Civil Authorities (Special Powers)
Act (Northern Ireland) (Special Powers Act).18 The Act was renewed
170. See generally F.S.L. LYONS, CULTURE AND ANARCHY IN IRELAND 1890-1939 (1982).
171. See generally CHARLES TOWNSHEND, POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN IRELAND (1983)
(providing extensive historical overview and brief analysis of Irish situation).
172. See BRENDAN O'LEARY & JOHN MCGARRY, THE POLITICS OF ANTAGONISM:
UNDERSTANDING NORTHERN IRELAND 30 (1993); CLIVE WALKER, THE PREVENTION OF TERRORISM IN
BRITISH LAW 19 (2d ed. 1992). These numbers do not include deaths occurring in Britain itself in the
context of the Northern Irish conflict.
173. O'LEARY & MCGARRY, supra note 172, at 40.
174. It is estimated that the extra security costs directly ensuing from the conflict between
1969 and 1990 were 1050 million Irish punts for the Republic of Ireland and some £4150 million for
the United Kingdom. See id. at 45.
175. See COLM CAMPBELL, EMERGENCY LAW IN IRELAND, 1918-1925, at 128 (1994)
(discussing riots under special emergency legislation titled "An Act for the more effectual Suppression
of local Disturbances and dangerous Associations in Ireland").
176. See, e.g., The Criminal Law and Procedure (Ireland) Act (1887) (allowing declaration
of association unlawful, permitting magistrates to interrogate witnesses in private and so forth); The
Prevention of Crimes (Ireland) Act (1882) (allowing suspension of jury trial in certain cases); The
Protection of Life and Property Act (1871) (permitting arrest and detention without trial of persons
reasonably suspected of membership in secret society); The Peace Preservation Act (1870)
(empowering magistrates to compel witnesses to testify during investigation of crime before trial).
177. TOWNSHEND, supra note 171, at 63.
178. See Fionnuala Ni Aolain, Where Hope and History Rhyme-Prospects for Peace in
Northern Ireland?, 50 J. INT'L AFF. 63, 67-68 (1996).
179. See FINN, supra note 4, at 53.
180. The Special Powers Act created two categories of offenses: those specified in the act
itself and those included in regulations issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs (who could delegate
the power to issue regulations to his subordinates, including RUC officers) under the Act. Under the
emergency regime established by the Act, "the Government enjoyed powers similar to those current in
time of martial law." Claire Palley, The Evolution, Disintegration and Possible Reconstruction of the
Northern Irish Constitution, 1 ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 368, 400 (1972).
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annually from 1922 to 1928, when it was extended for a five-year period. In
1933, the Act was made permanent. 8 ' Indicative of the state of affairs in
Northern Ireland is the fact that since the very creation of "Ulster,"
82
emergency legislation, such as the Special Powers Act, has become a normal
part of state procedure.
The end of the 1960s saw the rise of the Northern Irish civil rights
movement.' 83 The Stormont government reacted with hostility, ignoring or
rejecting outright its demands.'84 Seeing that its attempts to improve the
conditions of the minority community in Northern Ireland through political
and legal action had failed, the civil rights movement turned to mass marches
and protests.'85 Continuous rioting and violent clashes during many of the
marches, culminating in the Derry riots of August 1969, brought the
situation in Ulster to the brink of civil war. A dramatic shift in the nature of
the struggle occurred with the militarization of the conflict. The British army
replaced the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUG) as the force primarily
responsible for maintaining law and order in the territory. 8 6 The introduction
of the army into the conflict in this new capacity, combined with continued
rioting, the IRA's reassertion of its role as the spearhead of armed Catholic
resistance in the province,8 7 and the rise of several organized Protestant
paramilitary groups (such as the Ulster Volunteer Force and the Ulster
Defence Association), marked the move to this militarized stage of the
struggle. 88 Shortly after "Bloody Sunday,"' 89 British direct rule of Northern
Ireland was established in March 1972.'"
181. The radical nature of this piece of legislation was best reflected in section 2(4), which
provided that "[i]f any person does any act of such nature as to be calculated to be prejudicial to the
preservation of the peace or maintenance of order in Northern Ireland and not specifically provided
for in the regulations, he shall be guilty of an offence against those regulations." The South African
Minister of Justice was quoted as referring to section 2(4) when he said that he "would be willing to
exchange all the [South African] legislation of that sort for one clause in the Northern Ireland Special
Powers Act." COMMITTEE ON THE ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, No EMERGENCY, No EMERGENCY LAW 6
(1993).
182. "Ulster" is the name frequently used to refer to the six counties commonly known as
"Northern Ireland."
183. See FINN, supra note 4, at 56-58.
184. See id. at 57. The Government of Ireland Act of 1920 created two devolved Irish
parliaments-one holding jurisdiction in the six counties of the North of Ireland, the other controlling
in the remaining 26 counties in the South. The Northern Irish parliament was colloquially known as
"Stormont" after the area in which it sat.
185. See id. at 59-66.
186. See id. at 64-65.
187. The Provisional IRA was created after a 1970 split in the IRA. See generally J. BOWYER
BELL, THE SECRET ARMY: THE IRA (2d ed. 1996) (describing splinter); PATRICK BISHOP & EAMONN
MALLIE, THE PROVISIONAL IRA (1987) (same); TIM PAT COOGAN, THE I.R.A.: A HISTORY (1993)
(same).
188. See WALKER, supra note 172, at 17-20 (describing nature and tactics of various terrorist
groups operating in Northern Ireland).
189. On January 30, 1972, 14 marchers participating in an anti-internment demonstration
were shot dead in Derry by British paramilitaries. Subsequent government inquiries established that
none of those killed were armed, despite army claims to the contrary. The events of "Bloody Sunday"
led to full-scale sectarian violence throughout Northern Ireland. See FINN, supra note 4, at 73-74.
190. See id. at 75-76; see also Palley, supra note 180, at 445 (stating that Northern Ireland
(Temporary Provision) Act 1972 substituted Secretary of State for Governor of Northern Ireland to act
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In 1973, following the bloodiest year of the "Troubles," the British
Parliament enacted the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1973
(EPA), which repealed the Special Powers Act while retaining many of the
repealed statute's provisions in the new legislation. 9' In addition, the EPA
established the Diplock courts, in which the trial of persons suspected of
certain scheduled offenses was to be conducted by one judge, operating
under relaxed rules of evidence"9 and sitting without a jury.' 93 The EPA was
further amended in 1975, 1978, and 1987. In 1991, this legislation was
replaced by the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act (EPA 1991)
which, among other things, created new offenses and gave the authorities
additional emergency powers. 94
Another layer of emergency legislation applying to Northern Ireland
was added in 1974. Just a few days after a November 21 bombing of a
Birmingham pub killed twenty-one and injured more than 180 people,
Parliament passed the first Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions)
Act (PTA).' 95 While EPA 1991's sphere of applicability was limited to
Northern Ireland, this has not been the case with respect to the series of
PTAs.' 9' The PTA was enacted in the face of what was seen as the extension
of the IRA's terrorist campaign to the United Kingdom itself. Once again,
temporary emergency legislation obtained a permanent status when, after
being amended in 1975 and in 1983 and reenacted in 1984, the PTA became
permanent legislation with the passage of the PTA of 19892 9'
Emergency legislation in Northern Ireland has awesome regulatory
breadth and substance. Moreover, it has been maintained as a permanent
feature of the jurisdiction's legal landscape. Indeed, over time, its hold on
the Northern Irish legal system became ever more entrenched and broad-
based as the issues it regulated increased in scope. Furthermore, such
expansive emergency legislation had substantial impact on "ordinary," non-
emergency legislation. Along with the use of expressly defined emergency
powers in Northern Ireland came an increased emphasis on using and
modifying the ordinary law to cope with the civil strife.'s Hence, the story
as chief executive officer).
191. See generally KEVIN BOYLE ET AL., LAW AND STATE: THE CASE OF NORTHERN IRELAND
(1975).
192. See, e.g., Lord Lowry, National Security and the Rule of Law, 26 ISR. L. RV. 117
(1992) (describing reaction of courts in Northern Ireland to emergency situations).
193. See generally JOHN D. JACKSON & SEAN DORAN, JUDGE WITHOUT JURY: DIPLOCK
TRIALS IN THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM (1995).
194. See, e.g., Brice Dickson, Northern Ireland's Emergency Legislation-The Wrong
Medicine?, [1992] Pun. L. 592.
195. See generally PADDY HILLYARD, SUSPECT COMMUNITY-PEOPLE'S EXPERIENCE OF THE
PREVENTION OF TERRORISM ACTS IN BRITAIN (1993).
196. See FINN, supra note 4, at 118-34; WALKER, supra note 172, at 31-261; David Bonner,
Combating Terrorism in the 1990s: The Role of the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions)
Act 1989, [1989] PUB. L. 440.
197. E.C.S. WADE & A.W. BRADLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 591
(l1th ed. 1993); WALKER, supra note 172, at 33-39.
198. The prime example of this is the abrogation of the right to silence, first in Northern
Ireland, now extended to the rest of the United Kingdom. See Oren Gross, Theoretical Models of
Emergency Powers 243-48, 323-25 (1997) (unpublished J.S.D. dissertation, Harvard Law School),
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of the Northern Irish legislation combines permanent, complex, and de facto
aspects of emergency regimes. Conceptualizing the situation in terms of
"deviations" and "aberrations" from an otherwise general rule of
"normalcy" patently misses the point. Emergency is the norm in Northern
Ireland, not the exception.
In 1988, a case, Brogan and Others v. United Kingdom, brought to
Strasbourg addressed the applications of four persons arrested in Northern
Ireland under the provisions of section 12 of the PTA 1984, which provided
for special powers of arrest without warrant. 99 The applicants were detained
for periods from four days and six hours to six days and sixteen-and-a-half
hours, during which the police interrogated them about various offenses
ranging from membership in the IRA to participation in deadly attacks on the
police and the army. None of the four was brought before a judge, and none
was charged after subsequent release.2"0
While the Commission and the Court rejected most of the allegations
that the British government's actions had contravened the European
Convention,2 ' the Court ruled, by a twelve to seven majority, that they had
violated article 5(3) of the Convention, which requires that a person arrested
or detained "be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised
by law to exercise judicial power .... "2 A thirteen-judge majority also
found a violation of article 5(5) of the Convention, which makes available an
enforceable right to compensation to anyone who was subject to an arrest or
detention in violation of the provisions of article 5.2°3
Brogan was not a derogation case. On August 22, 1984, the British
government notified the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe that it
was withdrawing a previously submitted notice of derogation.Y No claim for
199. See Brogan and Others v. United Kingdom, 145-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 16 (1988)
[hereinafter Brogan (Court)]. The Commission's report was handed down on May 14, 1987. See
Brogan and Others v. United Kingdom, 145-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 57 (1987) [hereinafter Brogan
(Commission)].
200. See Brogan (Court), 145-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) §§ 11-21, at 19-21.
201. See id. §§ 53-54, at 29-30 (declaring majority decision regarding article 5(1) of
Convention); id. at 34-35 (declaring unanimous decision regarding article 5(4)); Brogan
(Commission), 145-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) § 98, at 62 (declaring unanimous decision regarding
article 5(1)); id. § 114, at 64 (declaring ten to two majority regarding article 5(4)).
202. Brogan (Court), 145-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) § 62, at 33-34. The Court did not define
with precision when a detainee or a person arrested ought to be brought before a judge in order to
comply with the "promptness" requirement. The Commission's decision on this aspect of the case (by
a majority of ten to two) was that article 5(3) had been violated with respect to two of the applicants
who had been detained for 5 days and 11 hours, and 6 days and 16 1/2 hours respectively, but had not
been violated with respect to two detainees held for periods of 4 days and 6 hours and 4 days and 11
hours respectively (a decision supported by an eight to four majority). The Commission gave no clear
indication as to how it reached that decision, or as to where the dividing line fell between what was
"prompt" and what was not. See Brogan (Commission), 145-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) §§ 104-108, at
63.
203. See Brogan (Court), 145-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) § 67, at 35; Brogan (Commission),
145-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) § 119, at 65 (nine to three majority).
204. See DAVID BONNER, EMERGENCY POWERS IN PEACETIME 88 (1985). British notices of
derogation were given, prior to 1984, in 1971, 1973, and 1978. See Derogation of 20 August 1971,
1971 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 32; Derogation of 23 January 1973, 1973 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R.
24; Derogation of 16 August 1973, 1973 Y.B. Eur. Cony. on H.R. 26; Derogation of 18 December
1998]
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 23: 437
derogation was made with respect to the factual or legal circumstances
giving rise to this case. Both the Court and the Commission held, however,
that the background circumstances of the case should be taken into account.
Thus, "[i]t is against the background of a continuing terrorist threat in
Northern Ireland and the particular problems confronting the security forces
in bringing those responsible for terrorist acts to justice that the issues in the
present case must be examined. "205
The opinions written by the seven dissenting judges of the Court
resonated with explicit, derogation-like language. A five-judge dissenting
opinion asserted:
The background to the instant case is a situation which no one would deny is
exceptional. Terrorism in Northern Ireland has assumed alarming proportions .... It
is therefore necessary to weigh carefully, on the one hand, the rights of detainees and,
on the other, those of the population as a whole, which is seriously threatened by
terrorist activity ....
While considering, therefore, that there was no breach of article 5(3) in the
instant case, we are anxious to stress that this view can be maintained only in so far as
such exceptional conditions prevail in the country, and that the authorities should
monitor the situation closely in order to return to the practices of ordinary lmv as soon
as more normal conditions are restored ....
The majority's opinion reveals that it too shared this sense of
emergency and urgency. Referring to its decision in the Klass case,2"7 the
Court remarked that "having taken notice of the growth of terrorism in
modem society, [the Court] has already recognised the need, inherent in the
Convention system, for a proper balance between the defence of the
institutions of democracy in the common interest and the protection of
individual rights.
20
Such language-stressing the exceptional nature of the situation and the
need to return to ordinary legal practices as soon as normalcy is restored-
could, without any need for modification, be transplanted into any
emergency-related judicial decision. But if the situation had been so
exceptional, posing a grave threat to the population, was not an official
derogation of article 5 adequate? Why would the British government choose
to withdraw its former derogation notices at a time when such exceptional
1978, 1978 Y.B. Eur. Cony. on H.R. 22.
205. Brogan (Commission), 145-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) § 80, at 59. In its opinion, the
Commission quoted from its report in the case of McVeigh and Others v. United Kingdom, App. Nos.
8022/77, 8025/77, 8027/77, 25 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 15, § 157 at 34 (1981), to the effect
that
.[t]he existence of organised terrorism is a feature of modern life whose emergence
since the Convention was drafted cannot be ignored any more than the changes in social
conditions and moral opinion which have taken place in the same period .... It faces
democratic Governments with a problem of serious organised crime which they must
cope with in order to preserve the fundamental rights of their citizens. ..
Brogan (Commission), 145-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) § 84, at 59.
206. Brogan (Court), 145-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 39-40 (Vilhjslmsson, Bindschedler-
Robert, G6lcftkl, Matscher, & Valticos, JJ., dissenting) (emphases added).
207. See Klass v. Germany, 28 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser A.) at 5 (1978).
208. Brogan (Court), 145-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) § 48, at 27.
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circumstances still existed in Northern Ireland? Essentially, the position
adopted in Brogan enabled the British government to enjoy the fruits of
derogation without having to incur the legal and political costs of such a
formal act.
Not surprisingly, this case also' invoked the margin of appreciation
doctrine. The dissenting judges applied the doctrine's broad, sweeping form
as developed in the derogation context to non-derogation circumstances
outside the scope of article 15.y A prime example of this attitude is found in
the dissenting opinion of Judge Martens, who stated that
[s]triking a fair balance between the interests of the community that suffers from
terrorism and those of the individual is particularly difficult and national authorities,
who from long and painful experience have acquired a far better insight into the
requirements of effectively combating terrorism and of protecting their citizens than an
international judge can ever hope to acquire from print, are in principle in a better
position to do so than that judge!
210
On its face, the Brogan judgment should win the approval of those who
believe that the Court and the Commission ought not assume a strongly
deferential attitude towards the claims of national governments. After all,
both institutions found the British government to be in violation of its
obligations under certain sections of article 5 of the European Convention.
Yet, as before, the picture is far from rosy. That a substantial number of
judges and Commission members were ready to treat this case as though it
were an emergency-related case has already been pointed out. Although they
did not claim that a public emergency existed, they recognized the possibility
of "context justification" for governmental actions that in fact derogated
from otherwise protected rights.21' Indeed, the Court and the Commission
permitted derogation treatment in circumstances in which none of the parties
coming before the Court or the Commission formally requested it-a far cry
209. See id. at 44-45 (Evans, J., dissenting); id. at 52, 54-56 (Martens, J., dissenting). But
see id. at 42 (Walsh & Salcedo, JJ., dissenting) ("Article 5 of the European Convention on Human
Rights does not afford to the State any margin of appreciation. If the concept of a margin of
appreciation were to be read into Article 5, it would change the whole nature of this all-important
provision which would then become subject to executive policy.").
210. Id. at 54 (Martens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
211. See Ni Aolain, supra note 124, at 121. On the other hand, with respect to the alleged
violation of article 5(1)(c) of the Convention, which permits an arrest or detention of a person when
that procedure is "effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on
reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence," European Convention, supra note 16, art.
5(1)(c) (emphasis added), the Court adopted the position of the Commission (and the British
government) that "such an intention [to bring the person arrested before the competent legal authority]
was present and that if sufficient and usable evidence had been obtained during the police investigation
that followed the applicants' arrest, they would undoubtedly have been charged and brought to trial."
Brogan (Court), 145-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) § 52, at 29. Both the Court and the Commission chose
to ignore substantial empirical indications that the reality was in fact different. See WALSH, supra note
166, at 33-34. While ready to examine the broad picture of terrorism in Northern Ireland, neither the
Court nor the Commission were ready to apply a similar approach to the exercise of governmental
powers of arrest and detention by the British government under article 12. Instead, they focused on the
specific case and eliminated from review the general experience concerning these extraordinary
powers of arrest. See Ni Aolain, supra note 124, at 119-21.
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indeed from the paradigmatic principles of exceptionality and temporal
duration.
Following the Court's decision in Brogan, the British government
submitted a Note verbale to the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe
invoking its right of derogation under the Convention.212 In general language,
it asserted the existence of a public emergency in the United Kingdom
emanating from the "campaigns of organised terrorism connected with the
affairs of Northern Ireland."213 The government specifically cited three
legislative provisions dealing with powers of detention and arrest, including
article 12 of the PTA. Yet the derogation notice did not include any mention
of events or developments taking place after August 22, 1984 (the date on
which the previous derogation notice was withdrawn), that might justify the
conclusion that a state of emergency had developed in the United Kingdom
since that date214 except for a brief reference to the Court's adverse judgment
in Brogan.
215
Under these circumstances, one could question whether a "public
emergency threatening the life of the nation" did in fact exist in Northern
Ireland in December 1988, as compared with the situation prevailing in that
area in August 1984, which, by the British government's own admission, did
not constitute a public emergency. The facts suggest that the 1988 derogation
was but a reaction to the adverse Brogan judgment rather than the result of
true necessity.216
This question came before the European Court in Brannigan and
McBride.217 Peter Brannigan and Patrick McBride were arrested by the RUC
under article 12 of the PTA. Mr. Brannigan was held in detention for six
days and fourteen-and-a-half hours and was subsequently released without
charge. Mr. McBride was detained for four days, six hours, and twenty-five
minutes, after which he too was released without charge. The facts of this
212. See 31 Y.B. Eur. Cony. on H.R. 15 (1988) [hereinafter Note verbale].
213. Id.
214. See VAN DUK & VAN HOOF, supra note 35, at 558.
215. See Note verbale, supra note 212, at 16.
216. At least some commentators have suggested that
[w]hen faced with the Court's judgment [in Brogan], instead of reversing the policy and
amending the legislation . . . the government entered a derogation from Article 5(3).
On the face of it this appeared as a blatant disregard of international law, not least
because the government had earlier explained to the Court during the course of the case
that it had not felt that a derogation was necessary . . . the timing [of the derogation]
indicated bad faith and an attempt to avoid compliance with the Brogan judgment,
rather than a necessary response to an emergency.
LAURENCE LUSTGARTEN & IAN LEIGH, IN FROM THE COLD: NATIONAL SECURITY AND
PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY 346 (1994); see also Ni Aolain, supra note 124, at 122 (stating
that derogation was issued as direct response to Brogan decision rather than to increase
violence). A counterargument might be that the withdrawal of the derogation notice in August
1984 was not due to a recognition that no state of emergency existed at the time but rather was
a result of a conviction that the domestic legislative scheme then in existence did not violate
any of the provisions of the European Convention, and that, therefore, there was no need for a
derogation notice. The Court's decision in Brogan drew the government's attention to its
mistake and required a derogation to maintain the government's obligations under the
Convention.
217. Brannigan and McBride v. United Kingdom, 258 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 34 (1993).
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case were, therefore, substantially similar to those of Brogan. This time,
however, the British government conceded that article 5(3)'s promptness
requirement was not met but invoked as a defense the derogation notice it
had submitted in December 1988, claiming that the article 5(3) violation was
justified under article 15.218 The issue, then, was whether the British
government's derogation was a valid one under article 15, the very question
that the Court left open in Brogan.219
The Court, accepting the position of the government and the
Commission on this matter, concluded that the 1988 derogation was a
genuine response to a persistent emergency situation.22° It decided that as far
as the "strictly required" question was concerned, it could not say that the
government had overstepped its margin of appreciation in its decision that
judicial control should not be made part of the process of extending
detention.221 The Court found that adequate and effective safeguards existed
against potential abuse of the arrest and detention powers given to the
government's agents. 2 The Court thus concluded that
[h]aving regard to the nature of the terrorist threat in Northern Ireland, the limited
scope of the derogation and the reasons advanced in support of it, as well as the
existence of basic safeguards against abuse, the Court takes the view that the
Government have not exceeded their margin of appreciation in considering that the
derogation was strictly required by the exigencies of the situation.m
Once again, the Court adopted an extremely broad conception of the margin
of appreciation, asserting that
it falls to each Contracting State, with its responsibility for "the life of [its] nation," to
determine whether that life is threatened by a "public emergency" and, if so, how far it
is necessary to go in attempting to overcome the emergency. By reason of their direct
and continuous contact with the pressing needs of the moment, the national authorities
are in principle in a better position than the international judge to decide both on the
presence of such an emergency and on the nature and scope of derogations necessary to
avert it. Accordingly, in this matter a wide margin of appreciation should be left to the
218. See id. §§ 37-38, at 48.
219. In the Brogan case, the Court stated that there was "no call... to consider whether any
derogation from the United Kingdom's obligations under the Convention might be permissible under
Article 15 by reason of a terrorist campaign in Northern Ireland." Brogan (Court), 145-B Eur. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A) § 48, at 28 (1988).
220. See Brannigan and McBride, 258 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) § 51, at 34 (1993). The Court
stated that "there [was] no indication that the derogation was other than a genuine response." Id. By
this, did the Court mean to say that the applicants had to demonstrate that the derogation was not
genuine? If so, the Court had completely reversed its position with respect to the burden of proof
concerning the existence of a "public emergency threatening the life of the nation." See Ni Aolain,
supra note 124, at 123 (observing shift in burden of proof favoring state derogation decision).
221. Brannigan and McBride, 258 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) §§ 58-60, at 54. The Court tersely
noted that " [i] n the context of Northern Ireland, where the judiciary is small and vulnerable to terrorist
attacks, public confidence in the independence of the judiciary is understandably a matter to which the
Government attaches great importance." Id. § 59, at 54.
222. See id. §§ 62-65, at 55-56. The Court alluded to the availability of the remedy of habeas
corpus, the right to consult a solicitor after 48 hours from the time of arrest, the right to inform a
relative or a friend of the fact of detention, the right to have an access to a doctor, and the fact that the
operation of the PTA had been kept under regular independent review.
223. Id. § 66, at 56.
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national authorities ... 224
In fact, the Brogan minority's position with respect to the margin of
appreciation doctrine now became the view of the majority. Although the
Court also repeated the accepted view that "[tihe domestic margin of
appreciation is . . . accompanied by a European supervision,"225 such
supervision seems unlikely to be effective in the context of emergencies, in
light of the extremely broad view of the margin of appreciation doctrine that
the Court adopted. According to the Court, "in exercising its supervision the
Court must give appropriate weight to such relevant factors as the nature of
the rights affected by the derogation, the circumstances leading to, and the
duration of, the emergency situation."226 Yet the Court failed to apply its
own set of criteria, neither discussing the circumstances leading to the
particular emergency nor-even more significantly-considering the
"duration of the emergency."
An inverse connection should exist between the scope of the margin of
appreciation allowed a derogating government in a particular case and the
duration of the emergency situation.227 All other things being equal, the
longer the emergency, the narrower, not wider, ought the margin of
appreciation allowed the state be. A similar doctrine exists in the area of
humanitarian law, which is increasingly converging with human rights
law. 8 For example, in dealing with cases concerning various aspects of the
Israeli administration of the territories that came under its control in 1967,
the Israeli Supreme Court developed a doctrine of "prolonged
occupation."229 Generally speaking, this doctrine means that as the duration
of Israeli administration of the territories became longer, the balance
224. Id. § 43, at 49 (emphases added); see also id. § 59, at 54 ("It is not the Court's role to
substitute its view as to what measures were most appropriate or expedient at the relevant time in
dealing with an emergency situation for that of the Government which have direct responsibility for
establishing the balance between the taking of effective measures to combat terrorism on the one hand,
and respecting individual rights on the other .. ").
225. Id. § 43, at 50 (quoting from judgment in Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(ser. A) § 207, at 78-79 (1978)).
226. Brannigan and McBride, 258 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) § 43, at 50.
227. See Ni Aolain, supra note 124, at 125.
228. See generally Asbjorn Eide, The Laws of War and Human Rights-Differences and
Convergences, in STUDIES AND ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND RED CROSS
PRINCIPLES 675 (Christophe Swinarski ed., 1984) (exploring convergence between law of war and
human rights law as trend in humanitarian law); Dietrich Schlindler, Human Rights and Humanitarian
Law: Interrelationship of the Laws, 31 AM. U. L. REv. 935 (1982) (same).
229. See, e.g., H.C. 87/85, Arjoub v. Commander of IDF Forces in the Judea & Samaria
Area & Others, 42(1) P.D. 353, 375-78 (Tsr. 1988) (suggesting that establishment of Military Court of
Appeals in areas administered by Israel reflects abandonment of draconian emergency measures
which-although justified in initial stages of military government-have no place in military
government existing for more than 20 years); H.C. 69/81, Abu Itta v. Commander of IDF Forces in
the Judea & Samaria Area & Others, 37(2) P.D. 197, 313-14 (Isr. 1983) (stating that legislative
authorities in areas administered by Israel ought to adapt legislative schemes to changing needs of
society); H.C. 337/71, Christian Association for the Holy Places v. Minister of Defense, 26(1) P.D.
574, 581-82 (Isr. 1972) (same). See generally Adam Roberts, Prolonged Military Occupation: The
Israeli-Occupied Territories Since 1967, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 44, 95-103 (1990) (noting applicability of
international legal rules to situations of prolonged occupation).
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between security and civil considerations gradually has shifted towards the
latter. At the same time, the Court has shown a growing willingness (at least
rhetorically)230 to review strictly the actions and decisions of the Israeli
military and civilian authorities in the territories. Insofar as security and
military considerations traditionally have been linked to a higher level of
deference that domestic courts accord their government and to the judiciary's
willingness to relax its review of executive discretion,23' the shift away from
such considerations towards the "civil" end of the spectrum could mark a
narrowing of the government's "margin of appreciation." It is submitted that
the approach of the Brannigan Court-expanding the leeway that the margin
of appreciation doctrine grants governments rather than narrowing it as the
particular crisis became more prolonged-was wrong. Although it operated
under the aegis of the derogation regime, it failed to comport with its most
basic tenets and principles relating to the exceptional nature of emergencies
and to their temporal duration.
When the British government issued its notice of derogation in 1988,
the situation in Northern Ireland was not materially different from what it
had been in August 1984.232 Furthermore, the United Kingdom regularly
derogated from its obligations under the European Convention due to the
situation in Northern Ireland from 1971 to 1984. Hence, according to the
British government itself, a "public emergency" must have existed in
Northern Ireland, if at all, from 1971 until 1989, when Brannigan and
McBride were arrested. Under such circumstances, how are notions of
temporariness and exceptionality relevant? What point is there in theorizing
about the extraordinary nature of emergencies and the need to return to
normalcy when the two have become one? Indeed, the 1988 notice of
derogation has yet to be repealed, and so it may be concluded that a situation
of emergency has legally existed in Northern Ireland for some twenty-seven
years. To what normalcy, then, can the region return?
Brannigan and McBride put the Commission and Court in a position to
express their opinions on the phenomenon of permanent emergency and its
problematic relationship with the purpose and language of article 15. Neither
rose to the challenge.
230. For critical assessments of the judicial practice of the Israeli Supreme Court with respect
to cases coming from the territories see, for example, LEON SHELEFF, THE RULE OF LAW AND THE
NATURE OF POLITICS 91-127 (1996); David Kretzmer, Judicial Review over Demolition and Sealing of
Houses in the Occupied Territories, in KLiNGHOFFER BOOK ON PUBLIC LAW 305 (Itzhak Zamir ed.,
1993); Shamir, supra note 126; and Leon Sheleff, The Green Line is the Border of Judicial Activism:
Queries A-bout Supreme Court Judgments in the Territories, 17 TEL Aviv U. L. REV. 757 (1993).
231. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF
VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH 54-60 (1993); THOMAS M. FRANCK, POLITICAL QUESTIONS/JUDICIAL
ANSWERS: DOES THE RULE OF LAW APPLY TO FOREIGN AFFAIRS? 10-30 (1992); HAROLD H. KOH,
THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION 134-49 (1990); LUSTGARTEN & LEIGH, supra note 216, at
320-59; Alexander, supra note 29, at 15-27.
232. See Ni Aolain, supra note 124, at 123; see also VAN DUK & VAN HOOF, supra note 35,
at 558 (stating that position taken by British government in Note verbale of 1988 demonstrates bad
faith).
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E. Patterns of Violations: The Turkish Cases
The breakdown of boundaries between normalcy and emergency,
between the rule and the exception, and the systemic failure of the European
Court and Commission to address situations involving elements of these two
allegedly separate realities is also evident in the developing jurisprudence
concerning systematic violations of human rights. For some time now, cases
before the Court and Commission have alleged ongoing human rights
violations by Turkish security forces.233 The complaints submitted to the
European human rights adjudicatory organs have been, for the most part,
concentrated geographically and ethnically. Most come from the southeastern
provinces and involve victims of Kurdish origin or suspected supporters of
the Kurdish cause.234 The scale and systematic nature of the alleged
violations make these cases unique in the history of the European
Convention.235
Since 1984, the Turkish government has been involved in a bloody
armed struggle against the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK).236 According to
governmental data, between 1984 and 1997, some 26,532 PKK members,
5185 security forces personnel, and 5209 civilians have lost their lives in the
conflict.2 37 Turkish security forces allegedly committed extensive and
systematic human rights violations-including forcible displacement of
civilian noncombatants,23 deaths in detention as a result of excessive force,
"mystery killings"239  and killings by "execution squads, 2 40
disappearances,24 and torture during detention or interrogation 2 -during
their fighting against Kurdish guerrillas in general and in the southeastern
region of the country in particular. Criticism also has focused on Turkey's
233. See, e.g., Aksoy v. Turkey, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 553 (1996) (Court report) (discussing
torture of alleged member of Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) in southeastern Turkey); Akdivar &
Others v. Turkey, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 143 (1996) (Court report) (discussing alleged burning of houses
by security forces in southeastern Turkey).
234. See generally AMNESTY INT'L, TURKEY: No SECURITY WITHOUT HUMAN RIGHTS
(1996); AMNESTY INT'L, TURKEY: A POLICY OF DENIAL (1995).
235. See Aisling Reidy et al., Gross Violations of Human Rights: Invoking the European
Convention on Human Rights in the Case of Turkey, 15 NETH. Q. HuM. RTs. 161, 162 (1997).
236. See generally MICHAEL M. GUNTER, THE KURDS AND THE FUTURE OF TURKEY (1997).
237. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TURKEY COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR
1997 § 1(g) (visited Apr. 29, 1998) <http://www.state.gov/vvwlglobal/human-rights/
1997 _hrpreport!> [hereinafter COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES].
238. It is estimated that between 2600 and 3000 villages in the southeastern provinces of
Turkey have been affected by that policy and that some 560,000 persons have been forcibly displaced
since 1984. See id.
239. Id. § 1(a).
240. Bit by Bit, Ugly Facts Come Out, ECONOMIST, Jan. 31, 1998, at 55 (discussing
execution squad rumored to have been responsible for "mysterious killing" of anywhere between 2500
to 5000 Kurds between 1990 and 1996).
241. See COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, supra note 237, § 1(b); see also
Stephen Kinzer, Rights Abuses Stain Turkey's Democratic Image, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 1997, at 3
(reporting kidnapping by Turks).
242. See COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, supra note 237, § 1(c); European
Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Public
Statement on Turkey, Dec. 15, 1992, reprinted in 14 HUM. RTS. L.J. 49 (1993).
1998] Entrenched Emergencies
suspension of civil and political rights, especially those of the Kurdish
minority.2 43 Indeed, the European Union explicitly cited Turkey's human
rights record and its treatment of its minorities as reasons for its decision to,
in all but name, accord lower priority to Turkey's application for
membership than to those of Cyprus and ten former communist countries.2"
In most instances, cases have found their way before the European
Court and Commission through individual complaints submitted under article
25 of the European Convention.245 This application mechanism-which
depends upon the complained-of state's recognition of the European
Commission's competence to receive such individual petitions246-became
available in 1987, when Turkey formally subjected itself to petitions against
it pursuant to a friendly settlement in an interstate case brought by France,
Norway, Denmark, Sweden, and the Netherlands.'7
An individual seeking to employ article 25's petition mechanism must
demonstrate to the Commission (and the Court, should the case come before
it) that one of the contracting states violated her protected rights.24 The
European jurisprudence has accepted, however, that such a complaint may
also raise a claim of "administrative practice" in breach of the
Convention.249 To show the existence of such a pattern of repeated violations
243. See COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, supra note 237, §§ 2-3.
244. See Luxembourg European Council, 12 and 13 December 1997: Presidency
Conclusions, §§ 31-36 (visited Apr. 28, 1998) <http:leuropa.eu.intlcouncillofflconclui
dec97.htm>; Ian Mather, Ankara Faces the Reality of Exclusion, EUROPEAN, Dec. 18, 1997, at 16.
Turkey first applied for inclusion in the European Economic Community in 1963. For a critical
assessment of the European Union's decision to reject Turkey, see, for example, The Luxembourg
Rebuff, ECONOMIST, Dec. 20, 1997, at 17; and Turkish Wrongs and Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18,
1997, at A26. Turkey's anger at the decision led it to boycott the EU London summit at which the
European Conference brought together the member states of the European Union and the European
states aspiring to join it for a first meeting. See Mesut Yilmaz, Ambivalent Turk, ECONOMIST, Mar.
14, 1998, at 60.
245. See VAN DuK & VAN HooF, supra note 35, at 37-52.
246. See European Convention, supra note 16, art. 25(1).
247. France, Norway, Denmark, Sweden & The Netherlands v. Turkey, App. No. 9940-
9944/82, 35 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 143 (1984) [hereinafter Friendly Settlement]. The
friendly settlement reached among the parties in this case, which received the blessing of the
Commission, is a further demonstration of the arguments pursued in this Article. One aspect of the
settlement has been the acceptance-in the context of article 15 of the European Convention-of the
Turkish Prime Minister's statement that he hoped that "we will be able to lift martial law from the
remaining provinces within 18 months." Id. at 211. Considering that the applicant states have argued
in their application that a state of public emergency had not existed in Turkey, however, their
readiness to accept that declaration could be seen as yet another sign of the shaky basis of the
derogation regime and its fundamental premises. See VAN DuIK & VAN HOOF, supra note 35, at 127.
248. See Webster v. United Kingdom, App. No. 7806/77, 12 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. &
Rep. 168, 168 (1978); X. v. Austria, App. No. 7045/75, 7 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 87, 87
(1977); X. v. Norway, 1961 Y.B. Eur. Cony. on H.R. 270, 276 (Eur. Comm'n on H.R.). The
existence of a potential risk of violation of a person's rights may suffice to consider her a "victim" for
the purpose of article 25(1). See, e.g., Kiass v. Federal Republic of Germany, 28 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser.
A ) at 18 (1979) (describing recognition by both European Court and Commission as victims five
individuals who argued that authorities used secret measures to violate privacy of mail and
telecommunications but who had no way of ascertaining whether such measures had been applied to
them or not); see also VAN DIJK & VAN HOOF, supra note 35, at 40-48 (arguing that risk of violation
was deemed sufficient to consider individuals as victims).
249. See, e.g., Donnelly v. United Kingdom, 1973 Y.B. Eur. Cony. on H.R. 212, 216 (Eur.
Comm'n on H.R.).
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and official tolerance, it is necessary to examine not only the particular case
at hand but also the more general context. As the Commission said in the
Friendly Settlement case, "[t]here is prima facie evidence of an alleged
administrative practice where the allegations concerning individual cases are
sufficiently substantiated, considered as a whole and in the light of the
submissions of the applicant and the respondent Party.""as
Modem Turkey is no stranger to public emergency. Turkey has
invoked article 15 of the European Convention for more than seventy-seven
percent of the period between June 1970 and July 1987, including a
continuous stretch of almost seven years from September 1980 to May
1987.21 In August 1990, the Turkish government reinvoked derogations
under article 15 and has maintained them to date. 2 In fact, since 1987, most
of the provinces of southeastern Turkey continuously have been subjected to
an emergency regime.253 Yet these data did not move the Commission to
conduct an independent review of the existence of public emergency in the
cases coming before it. As in Ireland v. United Kingdom, the Commission
accepted the parties' stipulation of the existence of a "public emergency
threatening the life of the nation." Thus, in its opinion in Aksoy, the
Commission ruled:
There is no serious dispute between the parties as to the existence of a public
emergency in South-East Turkey threatening the life of the nation. In view of the grave
threat posed by terrorism in this region, the Commission can only conclude that there is
indeed a state of emergency in South-East Turkey which threatens the life of the
nation.'
In its turn, the Court examined the issue only perfunctorily, ruling that
"in the light of all the material before it ... the particular extent and impact
of PKK terrorist activity in South East Turkey has undoubtedly created, in
250. Friendly Settlement, 35 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. at 165.
251. Turkey invoked article 15 from June 16, 1970, to August 5, 1975; from December 26,
1978, to February 26, 1980; and from September 12, 1980 to May 25, 1987. See 30 Y.B. Eur. Cony.
on H.R. 19 (1987); 23 Y.B. Eur. Cony. on H.R. 10 (1980); 22 Y.B. Eur. Cony. on H.R. 26 (1979);
21 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 18 (1978); 18 Y.B. Eur. Cony. on H.R. 16 (1975); 13 Y.B. Eur. Cony.
on H.R. 18 (1970) (reporting lifting of martial law in all Turkish provinces and ending of Turkey's
derogation).
252. See 33 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 14 (1990) (reporting derogation from articles 5, 6, 8,
10, 11, and 13 of the European Convention). The derogation notice mentions the death of 136
civilians and 153 members of the security forces in 1989 as a result of terrorist attacks, and the deaths
of 125 civilians and 96 members of the security forces since the beginning of 1990. See id.; 35 Y.B.
Eur. Conv. on H.R. 16 (1992) (limiting scope of existing derogation so as to apply only with respect
to article 5 of European Convention).
253. To date, a declared state of emergency persists in six provinces. Six other provinces are
under an "adjacent province" status which grants the provincial governors and the security forces
certain special powers. See COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, supra note 237, § l(f).
Emergency rule was lifted in October 1997 from three provinces-Bingol, Batman, and Bitlis-
although this has had only minimal effects on the extensive powers granted to the provincial
governors. See Turkey and the Kurds. By the Gun Alone, ECONOMIST, Oct. 11, 1997, at 57.
254. Aksoy v. Turkey, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 553, 572 (1996) (Commission report).
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the region concerned, a 'public emergency threatening the life of the
nation. '1,,255
Thus, the Court and the Commission have not independently
investigated whether, in the circumstances brought before them, a "public
emergency" existed. Their decisions on this matter have been conclusory,
accepting the parties' agreement while completely ignoring the realities of
continuous crisis and derogation from rights.2 56 This approach is all the more
striking when contrasted with two other elements of the Court's Aksoy
decision. First, the Court asserted that in exercising its supervision over
states' actions, it "must give appropriate weight to such relevant factors as
the nature of the rights affected by the derogation and the circumstances
leading to, and the duration of, the emergency situation."" Second,
discussing the Turkish government's compliance with the notification
requirements of article 15(3), the Court pointed out that "[n]one of those
appearing before the Court contested that the Turkish Republic's notice of
derogation complied with the formal requirements of article 15(3) . . . ."2
It went on to state, however, that "[t]he Court is competent to examine this
issue of its own motion .... 259
As was the case with respect to the Lawless, Ireland v. United
Kingdom, Brogan, and Brannigan and McBride decisions discussed above, a
cursory review of the emerging jurisprudence concerning the Turkish cases
may suggest that the Court and the Commission effectively are protecting
human rights: In a number of cases, they have held that a state infringed
upon the petitioners' individual rights.26
The various Turkish cases, however, like those concerning the conflict
in Northern Ireland, repeatedly have demonstrated a systemic inability to
deal with a normal reality of emergency. In Northern Ireland, emergency has
become a deeply entrenched feature of everyday life; similarly, in Turkey,
or at least in its southeastern provinces, human rights violations are now
commonplace. But in neither case has the Court or the Commission openly
recognized the inadequacy of conceptualizing the derogation problem in
terms of exceptionality, temporariness, singularity, and particularity.
Although the Northern Irish cases arose against a backdrop of prolonged
crisis, and the Turkish cases-if only by virtue of their sheer number-
reflected a more general phenomenon of widespread human rights violations,
255. Id. at 587.
256. Furthermore, both the Court and the Commission were ready to follow in the footsteps
of Brannigan and McBride as far as a broad scope for the margin of appreciation doctrine was
involved. See id. at 571, 586-87.
257. Id. at 587 (emphasis added).
258. Id. at 590.
259. Id.
260. The Commission has repeatedly based its decisions in these cases on findings that the
particular measures complained of have not been strictly required by the exigencies of the situation. In
practically all of the cases determined admissible, the Commission has also ruled that no effective
local remedies had been available to the complainant. See Reidy et al., supra note 235, at 165. The
Commission has not attempted, however, to examine whether a public emergency existed in the
circumstances coming before it.
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neither the Court nor the Commission accorded these circumstances the
weight they ought to have had when deciding the cases before them.
For the most part, the Court and the Commission have dealt with the
Turkish cases on a case-by-case basis while ignoring the implications of
systematic abuses and rights violations." Thus, for example, on the issue of
domestic remedies, Reidy, Hampson, and Boyle have concluded:
[I]n over 60 cases from South East Turkey declared admissible, the Commission has
found in each case that the applicants did not have an adequate remedy at their disposal
to address their particular complaint. However, the Commission has also always held
that as the individual applicants on the particular facts of their complaints had no
remedy available to them, the question of a systematic failure to provide domestic
remedies need not be addressed. The Commission's approach... nevertheless prompts
the question of how many cases are necessary in which applications, raising essentially
similar complaints, are admitted by reason of lack of effective remedies, before the
conclusion is reached that there is a practice of violation of the right to an effective
domestic remedy?'
Furthermore, as their study shows, both the Commission and the Court
have so far been reluctant in individual cases to take "a more pro-active role
in examining claims as to the existence of a governmental policy from which
serious and large scale violation stems,"263 even though the realities of the
Turkish situation should have been obvious. First, dozens of cases have
come from the same jurisdiction, each raising substantially similar
allegations against the Turkish security forces.2" Second, in some cases, the
complainants furnished the Court and the Commission with external evidence
accumulated by prestigious NGOs as well as by the U.N. Committee Against
Torture and the European Commission on the Prevention of Torture26"
pointing to the systematic abuse and violation of rights. For the most part,
neither the Court nor the Commission have sought to use this information as
a catalyst to determine whether administrative practice of torture in fact had
taken place.266
261. See, for example, Asian v. Turkey, App. No. 22497/93, 80-A Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec.
& Rep. 138, 144 (1995), in which the Commission stated that it did not
deem it necessary to determine whether there exists an administrative practice on the
part of the Turkish authorities of tolerating abuses of human rights of the kind alleged
by the applicant, because it agrees with the applicant that it has not been established that
he had at his disposal adequate remedies to deal effectively with his complaints.
See also Christian Tomuschat, Quo Vadis, Argentoratum? The Success Story of the European
Convention on Human Rights and a Few Dark Stains, 13 HuM. RTs. L.J. 401, 406 (1992) (describing
European system as focused on individual applications).
262. Reidy et al., supra note 235, at 165.
263. Id. at 172.
264. There were 927 total applications registered against Turkey in 1996 and 1997, 562 and
365 respectively. During the same period, 66 applications were declared admissible by the
Commission, 37 and 29 in each year respectively, while 422 were referred to the Turkish government,
78 and 344 in each year respectively. See European Commission of Human Rights, Survey of
Activities and Statistics (1997) tbl. E (visited Apr. 28, 1998) <http://www.dhcommhr.coe.fr/
eng/97tables.bil.html >.
265. See Reidy et al., supra note 235, at 171.
266. See id. at 171-72.
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It may not be surprising that the judicial institutions operating under the
European Convention have avoided dealing with systematic, large-scale
violations of individual rights. Such violations might be said to lie outside the
vision of the Convention, perhaps because such practices were considered
un-European. Like the derogation regime, the Convention as a whole may be
said to be based on the assumption that human rights violations are
exceptional. The Convention was meant, after all, to apply only to
democratic countries, which presumably respect human rights and the rule of
law.267 Moreover, even if the drafters of the Convention had contemplated
systematic violations of human rights, the subsequent practice under that
human rights instrument relegated this function to a secondary role .1 8 Be
that as it may, the Convention, as it stands today, is ill-equipped to deal with
such systematic infringements of human rights. 9
There are also certain practical difficulties that the Court and
Commission would have faced had they wanted to tackle the issue of
administrative practice in these cases. Ascertaining the facts-both with
respect to the concrete allegations made by the complainant in the case at
hand and to the more general "practice"-is especially difficult in
contentious situations in which the complainant has not sought local
remedies, as has been true of most such petitions coming out of Turkey.7 In
addition, it may well be that both the Court and the Commission have chosen
to avoid the possibility of declaring Turkey to have given governmental
consent-either by way of express authorization or by tacit acquiescence-to
widespread practices of torture, kidnapping, arbitrary detentions,
267. Thus, the Preamble to the European Convention speaks of the European states as being
"like-minded and [having] a common heritage of political traditions, ideals, freedom and the rule of
law." European Convention, supra note 16, pmbl. It also includes a reaffirmation by the signatory
states of "their profound belief in those fundamental freedoms which are the foundation of justice and
peace in the world and are best maintained on the one hand by an effective political democracy and on
the other by a common understanding and observance of the human rights upon which they depend."
Id.
268. As one commentator said:
It was believed that the Convention would serve as an alarm that would bring such
large-scale violations of human rights to the attention of other Western European states
in time for action to be taken to suppress them. In practice, this last function of the
Convention has remained largely dormant, coming to life in just a small number of
inter-state applications so far. The Convention has instead been used primarily to raise
questions of isolated violations of human rights in legal systems that basically conform
to its requirements and are representative of the 'common heritage of political
traditions, ideals, freedoms and the rule of law' to which the Convention Preamble
refers.
HARMS ET AL., supra note 29, at 2.
It may be argued that, paradoxically, the lack of experience in dealing with situations of
systematic patterns of human rights violations within the European context has made more difficult the
adjustment necessary to deal with such situations when they arise. See William J. Brennan, Jr., The
Quest to Develop a Jurisprudence of Civil Liberties in Times of Security Crises, 18 IsR. Y.B. HuM.
RTS. 11, 18 (1988) ("Prolonged and sustained exposure to the asserted security claims may be the
only way in which a country can gain both the discipline necessary to examine asserted security risks
critically and the expertise necessary to distinguish the bona fide from the bogus.").
269. See Menno T. Kamminga, Is the European Convention on Human Rights Sufficiently
Equipped to Cope with Gross and Systematic Violations?, 12 NETH. Q. Hum. RTs. 153, 154 (1994).
270. See Reidy et al., supra note 235, at 165-69.
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disappearances, unlawful killings, destruction of homes, and similar human
rights violations. The implications of such a finding on Turkey's relationship
with the European Convention would have been hard to predict. It is perhaps
possible that neither the Court nor the Commission was willing to risk the
possibility that Turkey might withdraw from the Convention, thus blocking
any opportunity for further review of human rights violations. Perhaps both
considered it preferable to offer remedies on a case-by-case basis rather than
lose that possibility altogether by making sweeping proclamations about the
practices of the Turkish government.
IV. INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS, NATIONAL EMERGENCIES
Emergencies exert great pressures against continued adherence to
protection of human rights. In times such as these, governments often
consider protecting human rights and civil liberties to their fullest extent as a
luxury that must be dispensed with if the nation is to overcome the crisis it
faces. Moved by perceptions of physical threat both to the state and to
themselves as individuals, motivated by growing fear and by hatred toward
the "enemy," the citizenry may support and even goad the government to
employ more radical measures against the perceived threats-to do whatever
is necessary to overcome the crisis. Aroused emotions frequently
overshadow rational discourse. Moreover, the sense that curtailed freedoms
and authoritarian measures will be temporary (until the particular danger is
over) and aimed against "outsiders"271 may smooth the transition into
governmental authoritarianism. In these circumstances, notions of the rule of
law, rights, and freedoms take a back seat, especially when the people
believe that legalistic niceties bar effective action by the government.
Exigencies tend to provoke the "rally 'round the flag" phenomenon, in
which governmental actions perceived as necessary to fight off the crisis
garner almost unqualified popular support (at least in the short run).2" A
crisis mentality can seize a whole nation and transform an otherwise peaceful
community into a "nation in arms.""' In the process, constitutional
structures may be ignored in the name of national security. Governmental
efficiency (not to say expediency) becomes paramount, and fundamental
constitutional principles may come tumbling down when the trumpets of
emergency blow. 4
271. See W.A. ELLIOTT, US AND THEM: A STUDY OF GROUP CONSCIOUSNESS 9 (1986)
(suggesting that crises lead to heightened individual and group consciousness such that internal
conformities within community are exaggerated while divergence from "outsiders" is emphasized).
272. See BRUCE RUssETT, CONTROLLING THE SWORD: THE DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE OF
NATIONAL SECURITY 34 (1990).
273. On the concept of "nation in arms," see DAN HOROwITz & MOSHE LISSAK, TROUBLE IN
UTOPIA: THE OVERBURDENED POLITY OF ISRAEL 28-29 (1990); and SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE
SOLDIER AND THE STATE: THE THEORY AND POLITICS OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS 37 (1957).
274. See, e.g., EDWARD S. CORWIN, TOTAL WAR AND THE CONSTITUTION 178-79 (1947)
(noting that federalism, separation of powers, and judicial review are primary structural elements of
peacetime constitution, but that powers of courts are limited during war and emergency).
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Domestic courts are considered the bulwark of rights and freedoms
against encroachment by the state. As exigencies tend to test the protection
of such rights and freedoms, courts are expected to be ever more vigilant in
a time of emergency. Much has been written, however, about national
courts' consistent failure to live up to this challenge.' Nor is such failure
unique to any one country or to any particular period in a nation's history.276
Faced with national crises, domestic judicial institutions tend to "go to
war," 277 much like the community in which they operate; they, too, "liked to
win wars."278 In states of emergency, national courts "rally 'round the flag"
by assuming a highly deferential attitude when called upon to review
governmental actions and decisions.279  The courts' abdication of
responsibility follows two major alternative judicial attitudes. On the one
hand, courts may invoke judicial mechanisms such as the political question
doctrine and proclaim issues pertaining to emergency powers to be
nonjusticiable. s° On the other hand, when deciding cases on their merits,
they are likely to uphold the national government's position."'
275. See supra text accompanying note 231; see also Brennan, supra note 268, at 20 ("With
prolonged exposure to the claimed threat, it is all too easy for a nation and judiciary . . . to accept
gullibly assertions that, in times of repose, would be subjected to the critical examination they
deserve.").
276. Evaluating the performance of domestic courts during World War I, George Bernard
Shaw was paraphrased as saying, "during the war the courts in France, bleeding under German guns
were very severe; the courts in England, hearing but the echoes of those guns, were grossly unjust;
but the courts in the United States, knowing naught save censured news of those guns, were stark,
staring, raving mad." Ex parte Starr, 263 F. 145, 147 (D. Mont. 1920); see also Anon Gutfeld,
"Stark, Staring, Raving Mad": An Analysis of a World War I Impeachment Trial, 30 Y.B. GERMAN-
AM. STUD. 57, 69 (1995) (quoting Montana federal judge George M. Bourquin quoting George
Bernard Shaw).
277. Michal R. Belknap, The Supreme Court Goes to War: The Meaning and Implications of
the Nazi Saboteur Case, 89 MiL. L. REv. 59, 59 (1980).
278. CLINTON RossrrER & RICHARD P. LONGAKER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
COMMANDER IN CHIEF 91 (expanded ed. 1976) (referring to U.S. Supreme Court).
279. Thus, for example, in a famous letter to Zechariah Chafee, Judge Learned Hand
described his rejection of the "clear and present danger" test that had previously been developed by
Justice Holmes in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 628-30 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Judge Hand's criticized the test, stating: "Besides even their Ineffabilities, the Nine Elder Statesmen
have not shown themselves wholly immune from the 'herd instinct' and what seems 'immediate and
direct' to-day may seem very remote next year even though the circumstances surrounding the
utterance be unchanged." Letter from Learned Hand to Zechariah Chafee (Jan. 2, 1921), quoted in
GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE 169 (1994). In a similar vein, Chafee
himself wrote that "the nine Justices in the Supreme Court can only lock the doors after the Liberty
Bell is stolen." ZECHARIAH CHAFEE JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 80 (1941).
280. See, e.g., FRANCK, supra note 231, at 10; KOH, supra note 231, at 146-48.
281. See, e.g., FRANCK, supra note 231, at 124 (supporting German courts rejection of
political question doctrine, but recognizing that "[m]easured by outcomes, the German judiciary,
taking jurisdiction in virtually every instance, has upheld the contested foreign-policy and security
initiatives of the political branches in roughly the same proportion.., as the U.S. federal courts have
by practicing abdication"); KOH, supra note 231, at 134; CHRISTOPHER N. MAY, IN THE NAME OF
WAR: JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE WAR POWERS SINCE 1918, at 261-64 (1989) (speaking of "ritualistic
approval" by courts of governmental emergency measures); Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, Are
Foreign Affairs Different?, 106 HARV. L. RV. 1980, 1991-95 (1993) (reviewing THOMAS M.
FRANCK, POLITICAL QUESTIONS/JUDICIAL ANSWERS: DOES THE RULE OF LAW APPLY TO FOREIGN
AFFAIRS? (1992)).
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The criticism leveled against domestic courts raises the question of
whether international judicial institutions can deal more effectively with
national predicaments. The argument is often made that international or
regional courts, which enjoy detachment and independence from the
immediate effects of national emergencies, are better situated to monitor and
supervise the exercise of emergency powers by national governments. 282 This
Article has shown that international and regional adjudicatory bodies are not
necessarily more effective in dealing with the concept of "public emergency"
than are domestic courts.
From the beginning, both the European Court and Commission283 have
indicated that they will not abdicate jurisdiction over article 15 questions.2
Both the Court and Commission, however, have assumed a deferential
attitude towards governmental assertions of conformity with the requirements
of article 15, challenging the practical significance of their own rulings on
their competence to decide these cases.
282. As one commentator pointed out, "[i]t is entirely possible that superior courts whose
relevant executive authority is not threatened may in fact effectively place limits on subordinate
executives. Thus, for example, the European Court of Human Rights can place limits on national
executives from countries which are signatories to the European Human Rights Convention."
Alexander, supra note 28, at 3. Indeed, as an example of the relative success of the international
adjudicatory mechanism compared with the domestic institutions, mention is made of the
jurisprudence of the European Court. See id; see also Green, supra note 161, at 112-13 (describing
international public opinion as sole means to promote protection of human rights, and European Court
as sole effective judicial mechanism of protection among international and regional human rights
adjudicatory organs).
283. Both institutions were established under article 19 of the European Convention. See
European Convention, supra note 16, art. 19. The Commission may start an investigation into a
complaint alleging that a State Party had violated the European Convention upon an interstate
complaint under article 24 of the Convention or upon an application of an individual, provided that the
State Party complained of had recognized the right to individual petition under article 25. See id. art.
24-25. At the time of this writing, all the States Parties to the Convention have made the optional
declaration required under article 25. Once an application is found by the Commission to be
admissible, the Commission attempts to achieve a friendly settlement between the parties, and if such a
settlement is reached, the case will be closed. See id. art. 30. If no settlement can be secured, the
Commission draws up a report that includes its findings of fact and its legal opinion as to whether they
reveal a violation of the Convention by the respondent state. See id. art. 31. The case may then be
referred to the Court or to the decision of the Committee of Ministers. Under the original Convention
system, the Court could hear cases referred to it by either the Commission or a state, but not by an
individual. Protocol 9 to the Convention, which entered into force on October 1, 1994 for the states
that ratified it, establishes the right of access of individuals to the Court. Interestingly enough, neither
the United Kingdom nor Turkey had ratified the Protocol as of December 31, 1997. If the case is not
referred to the Court, the Committee of Ministers, a political body, decides whether a violation of the
Convention had been committed and delineates the measures that the offending state must undertake to
remedy such a violation. See id. art. 32.
A major reform in the existing institutional structure is due to take place with the entry into
force of Protocol 11 on November 1, 1998. Under the Protocol, the Commission and the Court will
be replaced by a single, permanent European Court of Human Rights. Moreover, the new Protocol
limits the role played by the Committee of Ministers to supervising the execution and implementation
of the decisions handed down by the new Court. See Kamminga, supra note 269, at 162-63; see also
Andrew Drzemczewski & Jens Meyer-Ladewig, Principal Characteristics of the New ECHR Control
Mechanism, as Established by Protocol 11, 15 HUM. RTs. L.J. 81 (1994) (describing basic features of
reform).
284. See Lawless (Court), 3 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) §§ 28-30, at 56-57 (1960-61); Greece v.
United Kingdom, 1958-1959 Y.B. Eur. Cony. on H.R. 174, 184 (Eur. Comm'n on H.R.).
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Governments fare well when their decisions concerning the existence of
a particular situation of emergency are reviewed by the European human
rights judicial institutions. This is the result, on the one hand, of the systemic
difficulties that courts confront when they face national crises, and, on the
other, of a consistent failure to come to terms with the inadequacy of
traditional paradigms of emergency. While some of these difficulties are also
present at the domestic level, others are unique to, or at least more
pronounced on, the international plane. In the following few pages, the
Article will focus on this latter category of problems.
1. Delays. There is always delay in bringing applications before the
European Commission and another wait before the Commission and the
Court actually adjudicate a case.28 Although some measure of delay is a
feature of every judicial process-some have even argued that it is a positive
element when issues of emergency and national crisis are involved28 -it has
certain undesirable effects on the development of an international public
emergency jurisprudence. Delay may result in the loss of public interest in
the issues and the entrenchment of a "business as usual" attitude that
downplays the gravity of derogation measures in a particular case.287 This is
of special significance in light of the important role that public opinion plays
in the enforcement of international legal norms. Another result of the delay
may be a willingness by the Commission and the Court to accord a wider
margin of appreciation to national governments because of their recognition
of the difficulty in replicating the conditions that the government faced in
dealing with the exigencies of the time; frequently, they prefer to exercise
caution before asserting the superiority of the legal scholar over the "man of
action."288 It can only be hoped that the establishment of a one-institution
system under Protocol 11 may help minimize such delays in future cases.289
285. See Brendan Mangan, Protecting Human Rights in National Emergencies: Shortcomings
in the European System and a Proposal for Reform, 10 Hum. RTs. Q. 372, 379-82 (1988); Michael P.
O'Boyle, Emergency Situations and the Protection of Human Rights; A Model Derogation Provision
for a Northern Ireland Bill of Rights, 28 N.I.L.Q. 160, 182-83 (1977). Ireland v. United Kingdom,
1976 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 512 (Eur. Comm'n on H.R.), is a prime example of the inherent
weaknesses of the institutional structure. The European Commission is a part-time body, composed of
a small number of members, that meets only five times a year to deal with an ever-increasing number
of applications. It does not have the ability to review a situation of emergency on its own initiative-it
must await the submission of an application. Thus, for example, the Commission was unable to review
the situation in Northern Ireland until the formal application by the Irish Government in 1971. See
Mangan, supra at 380. One ought also to take into account the substantial number of applications
coming before the Commission, a fact that has led Steiner and Alston to conclude that "[t]he existing
system is unable to deal with the greatly increased number of cases ... [i]n 1993 it took, on average,
five years and eight months for a case to be finally decided (four years and four months before the
Commission and one year and three months before the Court)." STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 94, at
590.
286. See O'Boyle, supra note 285, at 183 (arguing that delay might better enable the
European Commission to reach a friendly settlement); see also MAY, supra note 281, at 268-70
(discussing benefits of delaying judicial review in times of war).
287. See Mangan, supra note 285, at 381-82.
288. In his dissenting opinion in The Greek Case, supra note 89, Delahaye emphasized the
distinction between the scholar (i.e., the Commission), who enjoys the benefit of detachment in time
and place from the actual or imminent crisis, and the man of action (i.e., the national government),
who is faced with concrete facts and is required to respond promptly to those facts as they arise.
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2. Interstate and individual applications. Since neither the Commission
nor the Court can initiate an investigation into a specific situation in a state
party to the European Convention,2" they must await a formal application by
another state party to the Convention291 or by an individual.2" Practice shows
that interstate cases are extremely rare, due mainly to such political
considerations as good relations, fear of retaliation, and competing political
interests.293 Furthermore, even when an interstate application is brought
before the Commission, the Committee of Ministers (the political organ of
the Council of Europe) usually makes the final ruling. Unfortunately, the
Committee "has shown an inclination to deviate from the Commission's
Report, invariably to take the heat off the offending state."294 Of course,
Unlike the scholar, the man of action has "the feeling" for the circumstances and for the most
effective way of dealing with them. Such a feeling "will almost certainly be absent in persons who are
not of the same nationality as those whose acts they are called upon to judge at a later date." Id. §
166, at 86. The logical conclusion of this line of argument is, of course, that in all but few extreme
cases, the European Commission would not be able adequately to evaluate the actions of a national
government in confronting an alleged "public emergency threatening the life of the nation."
289. On Protocol 11, see supra note 283.
290. Neither the Commission nor the Court have the authority to investigate on their own
initiative a particular situation of emergency in any state, nor are they authorized to monitor and
supervise derogation notices submitted by a state under article 15(3) of the European Convention. See
infra note 282.
291. Article 24 of the European Convention sets forth this procedure and automatically
applies it to any state party to the Convention. See European Convention, supra note 16, art. 24.
Under article 24, any state party may allege violations of rights protected under the Convention by
another state party, regardless of the existence of any connection between the individual victims of the
violation and the claimant state. See id.
292. The procedure is set forth in article 25 of the European Convention. See European
Convention, supra note 16, art. 25. The acceptance of this procedure was made optional to the states
parties. Since 1991, however, the individual recourse to apply to the Commission has been made
available against all states members of the Council of Europe.
293. Since the European Convention entered into force, interstate applications have been
submitted to the Commission in only a handful of cases:
Greece v. United Kingdom (1956)-complaining of certain measures applied by the
United Kingdom to the population of Cyprus, which was under British
administration at the relevant time.
Austria v. Italy (1960)-concerning the conduct of a trial of several men from South
Tyrol/Alto Adige who were accused of murder.
Denmark, Norway, Sweden & The Netherlands v. Greece (1967-1970)-concerning
alleged human rights violations by the Greek military junta.
Ireland v. United Kingdom (1971)-regarding, inter alia, the use of the "five
techniques."
Cyprus v. Turkey (1974-1977)-complaining about Turkey's part in certain events that
took place in Cyprus after 1974.
France, Norvay, Denmark, Sweden & The Netherlands v. Turkey (1982)-concerning
the situation in Turkey between September 12, 1980 and July 1, 1982.
Cyprus v. Turkey (1994)-alleging the continuing violation of certain provisions of the
Convention in relation to the application lodged in 1974.
Denmark v. Turkey (1997)-alleging ill-treatment of a Danish national.
See STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 94, at 594-95; The European Commission of Human Rights:
Organisation, Procedure and Activities, § 22 (visited Apr. 28, 1998)
<http://www.dhconmhr.coe.fr/eng/96organ.htm>; see also John Dugard, Obstacles in the Way of
an International Criminal Court, 56 CAMBRIDGE. L.J. 329, 338 (1997) ("The experience of human
rights treaties shows convincingly that states are unprepared to risk the disruption of relations with
other states by filing complaints against human rights violators in such states.").
294. Kamminga, supra note 269, at 162. Ireland v. United Kingdom, 1976 Y.B. Eur. Cony.
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individual applications have their own inherent difficulties. These are
especially apparent when individual applicants allege that human rights
violations have become "administrative practice," as in the Turkish cases, or
when "any individual case brought to the knowledge of the monitoring
bodies is representative of a general phenomenon with much larger
dimensions,"2 9' as, it is argued, has been true with both the Turkish and
Northern Irish cases.296
3. "Explosive situations." If international human rights adjudication is
"essentially a question about the impact of human rights law on national
sovereignty,"297 the issues involved in emergency-related cases go to the very
heart of a state's autonomy. These cases raise extremely sensitive and
complex political questions and therefore require the courts to examine such
explosive extralegal issues as the socioeconomic, cultural, political and
historical backgrounds of various conflicts.29
4. Establishing the facts and on-site visits. Another systemic difficulty
facing the international judicial bodies is the lack of a truly effective
factfinding mechanism. Under such circumstances, the international and
regional courts hesitate to interfere with the discretion of national
governments.299
5. The "margin of appreciation" doctrine. All of the above result in the
Court and the Commission according substantial deference to the decisions
and actions of national governments. The doctrine of the "margin of
appreciation" is the main mechanism by which this deferential attitude is
implemented. This doctrine and the jurisprudence developed around it inject
a significant element of subjectivity into the identification of public
emergencies.00 In so doing, the regional courts have weakened substantially
their authoritative position vis-a-vis national governments by undermining
their ability to invoke seemingly objective criteria when reviewing states'
decisions."' The introduction of the margin of appreciation doctrine has
on H.R. 512 (Eur. Comm'n on H.R.), is so far the only interstate case to come also before the Court.
The 1982 interstate case brought by the governments of France, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, and The
Netherlands against Turkey ended in a friendly settlement. See Friendly Settlement, App. No. 9940-
9944/82, 35 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 143 (1984). On June 28, 1996, the recent Cyprus v.
Turkey application was ruled admissible by the Commission. The 1997 application of Denmark against
Turkey was introduced to the Commission on January 7, 1997 and still awaits a ruling as to
admissibility. See Survey of Activities and Statistics, supra note 264, tbl. F. Most other applications
were decided by the Committee of Ministers and not referred to the Court. See Organisation,
Procedure and Activities, supra note 293, § 20.
295. Tomuschat, supra note 261, at 406.
296. See, e.g., Reidy et al., supra note 235, at 164-65 (arguing that principles appropriate
for dealing with isolated breaches of Convention may be inadequate when dealing with systematic
violations).
297. J.G. MERRILLS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE EUROPEAN COURT
OF HUMAN RIGHTS 9 (2d ed. 1993).
298. See Hartman, supra note 14, at 2; Clovis C. Morrisson, Jr., Margin of Appreciation in
European Human Rights Lmv, 6 HuM. RTs. J. 263, 269 (1973).
299. See Hartman, supra note 14, at 2.
300. See, e.g., Nicholas Lavender, The Problem of the Margin of Appreciation, [1997] EUR.
HUM. RTs. L. REV. 380, 380-81.
301. To a certain extent, the debate raging around the margin of appreciation doctrine is
reminiscent of the rules-standards debate. See generally MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL
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softened the criteria required before answering this question in the
affirmative. 3' Rather than trying to formulate rules based on strict
requirements, the international courts opted for more vague standards that
increased the leeway for discretion and flexibility. This, in turn, led to an
increased acceptance of governmental arguments and claims in concrete
cases. 3
03
The margin of appreciation doctrine means that when reviewing
whether a public emergency existed in a particular case or whether certain
governmental emergency measures were "necessary," the Commission and
the Court will not interfere with the state's judgment on the matter when it
falls within a certain margin of appreciation. If a derogating state's
appreciation is at least on the margin of its powers under article 15, the
courts should rule in its favor. The doctrine's rationale is that, in such cases,
the public's interest in an effective government and in the maintenance of
order ought to prevail. Maintaining law and order in the face of public
emergency is a delicate problem of appreciating complex factors and
balancing conflicting considerations of the public interest. The national
government is superior to the regional judicial bodies in its ability to resolve
this balancing problem because it is more familiar with the particular
circumstances and has more complete information than do either the Court or
the Commission. When the call is close, the decision by that government
STUDIES 15-63 (1987) (criticizing critical legal studies' substantive claims regarding choice between
rules and standards); FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION
OF RULE-BASED DECISIONMAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE (1991); SUNSTEIN, supra note 1; Louis
Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992); Duncan Kennedy,
Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. RV. 1685 (1976); Frederick Schauer,
Rules and the Rule of Law, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 645 (1991); Pierre Schlag, Rules and
Standards, 33 UCLA L. REv. 379 (1985); Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term
Forword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARv. L. REv. 22 (1992).
302. See generally Feingold, supra note 140, at 91; Hartman, supra note 14, at 3 (discussing
margin of appreciation doctrine as facilitating establishment of vague and inconsistent standards under
article 15).
303. See Mangan, supra note 285, at 375. Higgins argues that whether a "public emergency
threatening the life of the nation" exists is a question capable of an objective answer. See Higgins,
supra note 20, at 299-300. She concedes, however, that the doctrine may still be applied in connection
with the second element of article 15, the requirement that emergency measures be only taken to the
extent "strictly required by the exigencies of the situation." Since there will probably be alternative
methods to deal with an emergency, a margin of appreciation ought to be kept for the derogating
government. See id. at 300. Hartman goes a step further when she argues that the two basic
constitutive elements of article 15 are both "factors of considerable precision, capable of objective
verification" and thus do not leave room for any exercise of the doctrine. See Hartman, supra note 14,
at 16. In her opinion, the application of the margin of appreciation doctrine to article 15 waters down
the strict requirements included therein. See id. at 31 (arguing that review of question of
proportionality through prism of margin of appreciation doctrine has prevented interpreting "strictly
required" condition as meaning "essential or indispensable"); see also Karen C. Burke, Secret
Surveillance and the European Convention on Human Rights, 33 STAN. L. REV 1113, 1134 (1981)
(arguing that even relatively clear standards tend to become somewhat skewed when applied to any
given case through margin of appreciation doctrine); PROCEEDINGS OF THE 8TH INTERNATIONAL
COLLOQUY ON THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 236-37, quoted in Lord Lester of
Herne Hill, Q.C., Universality Versus Subsidiarity: A Reply, [1998] EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 73, 75-
76 ("The concept of the margin of appreciation has become as slippery and elusive as an eel. Again
and again the Court now appears to use the margin of appreciation as a substitute for coherent legal
analysis of the issues at stake.").
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should be upheld, even if the Court, for example, would have come to a
different conclusion on de novo review. Invalidating a state's judgment on
this matter is possible only when that judgment is entirely outside the
margin. The sense that the national government is in "a better position" than
either the Court or the Commission when issues of derogation under article
15 are concerned makes it almost impossible to obtain a decision against a
national government in situations alleged to amount to "public emergencies
threatening the life of the nation."" The practice of the Court and the
Commission demonstrates the pernicious use of the doctrine to avoid
conducting an independent examination of the evidence and the tendency to
succumb to the position of the relevant national government. 5
No less alarming is the phenomenon of spillover in the use of the
margin of appreciation doctrine and its transformation from a doctrine
applicable in only exceptional cases to a decision rule used in "normal"
ones. 6 The European Court and Commission developed the doctrine in
"explosive situation" cases dealing with situations of "public emergency"
and with states' derogations under article 15." Once invoked, however, the
resort to that doctrine spilled over from the emergency area to other cases
304. See, e.g., Green, supra note 161, at 100 (stating chance of state being found to have
unjustifiably declared public emergency or having used measures not "strictly required" by exigencies
is slim). On the other hand, a favorable approach towards the margin of appreciation doctrine was
expressed by a former president of the European Court. He wrote that the doctrine was "one of the
more important safeguards developed by the Commission and the Court to reconcile the effective
operation of the [European] Convention with the sovereign powers and responsibilities of governments
in a democracy." Humphrey Waldock, The Effectiveness of the System Set Up by the European
Convention on Human Rights, 1 Hum. RTs. L.J. 1, 9 (1980). Clovis Morrisson has argued that
"applied very cautiously, the doctrine of margin of appreciation is defensible. Some latitude must be
given the governments in difficult situations. But the Commission must be very judicious in granting
this latitude." Morrisson, supra note 298, at 286. In his opinion, article 15's vague and general
language inherently leaves wide discretion in the hands of the national governments. Thus, he claims
that the margin of appreciation doctrine has been utilized by the Court and the Commission as a
technique to assert a place for their own discretion in determining whether the derogation power had
been wrongly exercised in any given case. See id. at 267. However, Morrisson agrees that, in
practice, the doctrine became associated with judicial self-restraint. See id. at 274-75. In contrast,
Higgins has referred to "an area of dangerous passivity" by the Court and Commission. See Higgins,
supra note 20, at 314.
Another possible benefit of the margin of appreciation doctrine is the potential reaction by
states deciding whether to denounce the European Convention and withdraw their recognition of the
competence of the Commission and Court. See id. at 313; Morrisson, supra note 298, at 283-86.
Higgins notes that the European organs might use the doctrine to calm the anxiety of member states,
while, in fact, not implementing the concept in the case at hand. See Higgins, supra note 20, at 296-
301; see also Paul Mahoney, Judicial Activism and Judicial Self-Restraint in the European Court of
Human Rights: Two Sides of the Same Coin, 11 HUM. RTs. L.J. 57, 78-79 (1990) (dealing with
margin of appreciation doctrine in non-emergency context).
305. See, e.g., Burke, supra note 303, at 1134 (suggesting that "deference" too frequently
means abdication of independent roles for Court and Commission); Feingold, supra note 140, at 98-
99 (citing example in which "the Commission examined only the reasonableness and the good faith of
the English courts"); Higgins, supra note 20, at 314 (recounting case in which "[tihe Commission has
used margin of appreciation as self-denying ordinance against its own review of all evidence before [a
national] court"); Ni Aolain, supra note 124, at 115 ("The margin of appreciation doctrine has been a
crucial aspect of the retreat from substantive scrutiny.").
306. See, e.g., VAN DIM & VAN HOOF, supra note 35, at 604 (comparing margin of
appreciation doctrine to "spreading disease").
307. See Morrisson, supra note 298, at 269.
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dealing with non-emergency situations. In other words, the margin of
appreciation doctrine, which was born in the context of the derogation
regime, came to be fully operative in non-derogation matters. 0 At first, it
carried over to other explosive yet non-emergency situation cases outside the
purview of article 152" From there, the doctrine permeated nonexplosive
cases concerning, for example, child custody and visitation rights, freedom
of expression, and property rights.310 The broad application of the doctrine in
the "explosive situation" cases, resulting in no small measure from the
Court's and Commission's reluctance to interfere in such sensitive issues,
was projected onto ordinary cases arising in times of peace." Thus, it has
been argued that
[b]y applying the doctrine of margin of appreciation to Articles 8 through 11, the
Commission and Court have extended to Member States unlimited discretion to restrict
the enumerated rights . . . . [I]he doctrine has been used to circumvent the express
requirements of the Convention .... [B]y applying the doctrine to the non-emergency
articles, the Commission and Court have effectively abdicated their powers of
enforcement under the Convention and have thereby jeopardized the individual rights




308. See YOUROW, supra note 128, at 21-22.
309. See Morrisson, supra note 298, at 269-75. Iversen v. Nonvay, 1963 Y.B. Eur. Cony.
on H.R. 278 (Eur. Comm'n on H.R.), resulted from an application by a dentist against a Norwegian
law forcing him under threat of criminal action to work for one year in the public dental sector and in
an area of the country where there were very few dentists. The applicant argued that such an imposed
legal obligation amounted to "forced labor," prohibited under article 4(2) of the European
Convention. See id. at 302-04. The case posed a serious challenge to the continued viability of the
Norwegian health care system. Using the margin of appreciation doctrine, the two commissioners
accepted the Norwegian government's claim that the lack of dentists in northern Norway created an
emergency that threatened the well-being of the relevant community. See id. at 328-30; HARRIS ET
AL., supra note 29, at 96.
In the Case Relating to Certain Aspects of the Laws on the Use of Languages in Education in
Belgium (No. 2) (Merits), 6 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 31 (1968), the applicants-French-speaking
parents-argued that Belgian legislation regulating the choice of language of instruction in Belgian
schools violated various rights protected under the European Convention. The Court extended the
application of the margin of appreciation doctrine in this case from the derogation sphere and
established its use in ordinary non-derogation cases. See id.; YOUROW, supra note 128, at 71-79
(describing case); see also Klass v. Germany, 28 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 5 (1977) (evaluating secret
surveillance as part of fight against organized crime and terrorism).
310. See Feingold, supra note 140, at 94; Morrisson, supra note 298, at 275-83.
311. See Feingold, supra note 140, at 94-95. Feingold points especially to the pernicious
effects resulting from the application of the margin of appreciation doctrine to such vague categories
included in the limitation clauses as the "protection of morals." The combination of the vague concept
and the flexible doctrine often permits the state to bypass the limitations included in the Convention.
See id. at 95; see also Higgins, supra note 20, at 313-15 (stating that effect of margin of appreciation
doctrine in limitation clauses is tantamount to allowing governments to have "two bites at the
cherry.").
312. Feingold, supra note 140, at 95. The problematic use of the doctrine with respect to
vague limitations such as "protection of morals" was exemplified by the case concerning the
conviction of a London publisher under the Obscene Publications Act of 1959 for the possession for
publication for financial profit of The Little Red Schoolbook. See Handyside v. United Kingdom, 24
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 24-25 (1976). Thus, Feingold notes that "[u]nder Article 10 [of the
European Convention, concerning the freedom of expression], necessity and not reasonableness should
be the yardstick by which the Commission measures a Member State's interferences with an
individual's right to freedom of expression." Feingold, supra note 140, at 98. Higgins also criticizes
the decision in Handyside as one that "has gratuitously kept alive a concept which has been
increasingly difficult to control and objectionable as a viable legal concept." Higgins, supra note 20,
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The pattern established is one in which the jurisprudence of emergency
affects, and is carried over into, the jurisprudence of "normalcy." This, in
turn, diminishes the practical value of a clear separation of normalcy and
emergency, bringing the two closer together as far as judicial treatment is
concerned.
6. Lack of Effective Remedies. One also should not forget the lack of
effective remedies under the European Convention, which exacerbates the
systemic difficulties that the human rights courts face. The only remedy
against a state that fails to rectify a violation of the Convention is expulsion
from the Council of Europe. The legal implications of such a move are
limited, although the political ramifications may carry more weight. 3
Ironically, the legal result of expulsion is the release of the violator state
from all Convention obligations, enabling it to "derogate" from non-
derogable rights and to violate other protected rights in situations not
amounting to a "public emergency threatening the life of the nation."s"'
V. CONCLUSION
Analysis of the jurisprudence of the European Court and Commission
addressing governmental claims of a "public emergency" warranting
derogation from otherwise protected human rights reveals a consistent failure
to see the inadequacy of traditional paradigms. The basic rationale
underlying derogation calls for taking into account states of emergency in
devising international and regional legal regimes-the interests of states
faced with emergencies are to be recognized and accommodated. However,
this accommodation ought to take place within the confines of legality. It is
the legal system that sets the parameters for accommodation and that
establishes the pattern of balancing state security with the demands of
individual freedoms, liberties, and rights. For accommodation to be
meaningful while still respecting the fundamental goal of the major human
rights conventions, a well-defined relationship between normalcy and
emergency must exist. Normalcy must form the general rule, the ordinary
state of things; emergency must be an exception, an aberration. The
derogation regime is founded upon this premise. It ushers in a unique set of
rules and norms different from that governing activity in ordinary times.
These unique rules must remain generally unused if they are to be prevented
from dominating the ordinary normative structure.
at 315.
313. The fear of potential expulsion is by no means restricted to the state concerned. On the
contrary, the European institutions are far more apprehensive of creating a position that will require
such a step (or even voluntary withdrawal by a state). See Mangan, supra note 285, at 382. Expulsion
or voluntary withdrawal may send shock waves throughout the system. The only instance of such a
rupture was Greece's denunciation of the European Convention and its subsequent withdrawal from
the Council of Europe in 1969. It is doubtful whether today, after several decades of operation, a strict
approach by the European Court and Commission would lead to a similar state reaction. See Hartman,
supra note 14, at 51.
314. See Green, supra note 161, at 98; Hartman, supra note 14, at 2, 48-49.
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The jurisprudence of the European Court and Commission shows the
difficulties of applying the derogation regime without examining the
applicability of its underlying assumption to the real world. Having to treat
emergencies as exceptional in order to maintain the paradigmatic regime, the
Court and Commission consistently have ignored the entrenched nature of
the emergencies in Northern Ireland and the southeastern provinces of
Turkey. They have preferred to focus on one image rather than the whole
scene in front of them. Their review of the relevant circumstances treats the
pertinent facts as a series of snapshots rather than as an ongoing, continuous
motion picture. Thus, Lawless, Ireland v. United Kingdom, Brogan, and
Brannigan and McBride are considered as four distinct scenarios rather than
as complementary parts of a greater whole in which the relationship between
normalcy and emergency is reversed. Here emergency constitutes the virtual
norm with normalcy forming a mere (somewhat theoretical) exception.
Neither the Court nor the Commission has considered the implications of this
series of cases. Both institutions have so far managed to avoid taking to their
logical conclusion the fact that the United Kingdom has maintained an almost
permanent derogation notice with respect to Northern Ireland and that the
situation in Northern Ireland constitutes a permanent emergency situation." 5
Both institutions also have disregarded the prolonged state of emergency
persisting in the southeastern regions of Turkey. A reality in which
emergency is routinized is ignored in favor of maintaining legal fictions of
normalcy and regularity.
It is beyond the scope of this Article to examine the more general
contention that "[elmergency government has become the norm."316 Yet one
cannot dismiss the fact that, in at least some cases, clear demarcations
between normalcy and emergency no longer exist. It is particularly in such
situations that we must carefully consider whether existing legal
formulations-based on traditional conceptions about the relationship
between normalcy and emergency-apply. Reevaluation of the assumed
exception as it applies to derogation cases is all the more urgent now in the
European context in light of the substantial expansion of the Council of
Europe and the European Convention to include many Central and Eastern
European states.3" 7 The potential for imposing an increased burden on an
already overburdened regional judicial system by expanding the constituency
that might seek protection against human rights violations is certainly a valid
concern. Moreover, the inclusion within the European human rights regime
of countries that do not enjoy long and established traditions of protecting
human rights" 8 and that may need to extend the use of the derogation
315. See Ni Aolain, supra note 124, at 124-26.
316. See A Brief History of Emergency Powers in the United States, supra note 28, at v; see
also Arthur S. Miller, Crisis Government Becomes the Norm, 39 OHno ST. L.J. 736, 737 (1978)
(predicting that crisis government will become worldwide norm).
317. See, e.g., David Seymour, The Extension of the European Convention on Human Rights
to Central and Eastern Europe: Prospects and Risks, 8 CONN. J. INT'L L. 243 (1993).
318. See Rolv Ryssdall, Opinion: The Coming of Age of the European Convention on Human
Rights, [1996] EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 18, 26 (stating legal systems of new members do not yet
500
Entrenched Emergencies
mechanism to a new category of economic emergencies exacerbates the
challenges facing the supervisory machinery of the European Convention.1
2
1
meet standards required by Convention).
319. See Macdonald, supra note 39, at 236.
320. One aspect of this exacerbated challenge is mentioned by Lord Lester of Herne Hill:
The danger of continuing to use the standardless doctrine of the margin of appreciation
is that, especially in the enlarged Council of Europe, it will become the source of a
pernicious "variable geometry" of human rights, eroding the acquis of existing
jurisprudence and giving undue deference to local conditions, traditions and practices.
That danger will be exacerbated with the enlargement of the Convention by the new
democracies.
Lord Lester of Herne Hill, Q.C., supra note 303, at 76 (quoting himself in previous report). The task
is not made easier by the fact that membership was offered to, and accepted by, Russia before that
country gave any meaningful guarantees that it would improve its human rights record. See Bill
Bowring, Russia's Accession to the Council of Europe and Human Rights: Compliance or Cross-
Purposes?, [1997] EUR. HUM. RTs. L. Rnv. 628, 628-29.
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